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ABSTRACT 
 
Living by a commercial ethic and resisting English encroachment from New England, 
the Dutch made at least 40 land purchases by written deed from their Indian neighbors from 
1630 to 1664. In the past, scholars have seen only a European instrument of dispossession 
in the so-called “Indian deeds” that document land transfers from Indians to Europeans. In 
fact, they are colonial phenomena with uniquely Indian qualities. This is particularly true of 
the Dutch-Indian deeds signed or marked between 1630 and 1664. The Dutch-Indian deeds 
of the seventeenth century exhibit a middle ground of land tenures, in which the Dutch were 
compelled to yield to aspects of Indian land tenure and law in order to successfully purchase 
the land and retain it without facing retaliation. Indians, for their part, partook in the sale 
rituals of the literate world—deed-signing—but resisted European notions of land deals as 
fixed, permanent agreements. The Dutch-Indian deeds thus emerge as fluid agreements that 
were a compromise between Dutch and Indian land tenures and legal conventions.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 1630, the Director and Council of New Netherland, representing an 
aspiring patroon named Michael Paauw, purchased Hobocanhackingh/Hoboken Island 
from three Munsee Indians, Arommeauw, Tekwappo and Sackwomeck, “inhabitants and 
co-owners of the land,” claiming to “[act] for themselves and rato caverende for the rest of 
the co-proprietors of the aforesaid land.” The terms of one of the earliest written deeds for 
land between the Dutch and Indians are extensive, covering all potential breaches of the 
agreement, and very direct in their tone: the proprietors “sold, transported, ceded, conveyed 
and transferred [the land] in just, true and free ownership,” to Paauw. In case those verbs 
were not clear enough, the document elucidated further; the land was to be transferred 
with all the interests, rights and jurisdiction belonging to…the grantors, in their 
aforesaid capacity, constituting and substituting the aforesaid Mr. Paauw in their place 
and stead…and at the same time giving to and conferring on…[him] full and absolute 
power and command…to enter upon, peaceably possess, occupy, plant, use and 
cultivate the aforesaid land, and…do, act and dispose, as he would…with…other 
lawfully acquired lands and estates, without the grantors...retaining, reserving or 
holding therein any part, right, interest or authority in the least, whether of 
possession, command or jurisdiction, but are now and forever fully and finally 
yielding and renouncing it for the behoof of the aforesaid; further promising…to 
deliver and hold the aforesaid land free from claims, challenges, encumbrances and 
pretentions which anyone hereafter may make, and also to have this sale and transfer 
approved, ratified and acknowledged as valid by the remaining co-owners, all in good 
faith, without guile or deceit. 
 
All this was granted in return for “a certain quantity of [European] merchandise, which they 
acknowledge to have received…before the approval of this document.”1 To modern Western 
                                                 
1
 Indian Deed to Michiel Paauw for Land in New Jersey, 12 July 1630, in New York Historical Manuscripts: 
Dutch, vols. GG, HH, and II, Land Papers, ed. and trans. Charles T. Gehring (Baltimore: Genealogical 
Publishing Co., 1980), 1. 
 2 
 
eyes, analyzing this document unaccompanied, these Indians seem to have paid an exorbitant 
price for ordinary European goods.  
Though the precise amounts and types of trade goods that these men received is 
unknown, the feeling comes from a Western, economics-based sense of value—the idea that 
no amount of such pedestrian items could have constituted proper compensation for a piece 
of land. It also comes from a modern knowledge of Amerindian peoples’ ultimate territorial 
dispossession over time. The infamy of the 1626 Manhattan Island purchase for 60 guilders 
in goods is proof of this. It has been repeatedly contemplated and cited as proof of European 
swindling of Indians in American popular culture, both for the sale price and the probable 
mode of payment (trade goods).
2
 The sellers of Hoboken Island, thus, appear to be on the 
losing end of the bargain from their earliest dealings with the European strangers, at the frail 
beginning of centuries of dispossession and abuse to come. But nothing can ever be fully 
understood without context. 
The legacy of Euro-Indian contact in the Americas has long been one of conquest 
and subjugation of American indigenous peoples by ethnocentric outsiders with a thirst for 
land. At some moments, this story of invasion and colonization has been glorified; at others, 
                                                 
2
 Here are two relatively recent examples of non-scholarly news sources analyzing the Manhattan purchase. 
Both rely on common views of the purchase and try to reexamine it, determining what the true price was and 
what it might have meant to the indigenous sellers: Matt Soniak, “Was Manhattan Really Bought for $24?” 
Mental Floss, October 2, 2012, accessed February 2, 2017, http://mentalfloss.com/article/12657/was-
manhattan-really-bought-24; and “Buying Manhattan,” The Economist, December 23, 1999, accessed 
February 2, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/346918. Note: As the former article explains, no one can 
know for certain what the sellers of Manhattan Island were paid in, because Pieter Schagen only stated that 
the Company’s representatives “purchased the Island Manhattes from the Indians for the value of 60 
guilders,” with no other details given; however, if decades of subsequent purchases are any indication, the 
Dutch probably paid in trade goods and wampum, goods that they knew interested their indigenous partners. 
See Pieter Schagen Letter, 7 November 1626, reproduced and translated by the New Netherland Institute,  
http://www.newnetherlandinstitute.org/history-and-heritage/additional-resources/dutch-treats/peter-schagen-
letter/. 
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it has been heavily criticized. Awareness of the process of Indian territorial dispossession by 
European force and deceit has arguably been the most important lesson at the heart of this 
reading of intercultural relations. This narrative is problematic in that it has not been 
sufficiently qualified with the historical scenarios that contradict it. While the aim of this 
thesis is not to accept or refute theories about the nature of European colonization of the 
Americas broadly, it does aim to encourage questioning of the assertion that Europeans 
simply stole Indians’ land. It will do this by examining a specific arena of contact: that of the 
Dutch and their Munsee, Mahican and Mohawk (Iroquoian) neighbors in the first half of the 
seventeenth century.  
This thesis will neither add to nor reject the general argument of forceful 
dispossession directly, because to do so would be to take a very narrow slice of chronology, 
a small piece of the North American continent, and a very particular set of political, 
economic, and cultural circumstances and use them to answer for hundreds of years of 
interaction between a variety of political and ethnic groups with wildly different interests. 
Instead, it aims to contribute to and encourage analysis of Euro-Indian contact and 
interaction on a case-by-case basis, to allow for a more nuanced set of conclusions to develop 
over what occurred during each period of interaction.  
This thesis argues that the early seventeenth-century land transactions between the 
Dutch and their Indian neighbors in the Hudson River Valley exhibit characteristics of a legal 
and cross-cultural “middle ground”3 in notions of land tenure despite being in European 
                                                 
3
 The term, “middle ground,” was coined by Richard White to describe Franco-Indian interaction in the Great 
Lakes region in the early seventeenth century. He defined it as an arena in which culturally different peoples 
roughly equal in power try to pursue their own ends through mutual cultural “accommodation.” In his words, 
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form as written documents. It will reveal this frontier of necessitated accommodation 
between trading partners by contextualizing the Dutch and Indian presence in the area, 
introducing the ideas that undergirded their respective territorialities, and by examining their 
motives for yielding to one another in land matters. Most importantly, it will elucidate the 
qualities of this middle ground through a close analysis of the approximately 40 extant 
agreements recording Indian land transfers to the Dutch from 1630 (the date of the earliest 
formal, written deed) to August, 1664 (the date of the first Dutch capitulation to neighboring 
English forces). It is in the records of these transactions, their negotiation, and the de jure 
and de facto metamorphosis of their terms that this legal borderland becomes visible. 
Though these deeds have been analyzed before, it has always been done alongside Anglo-
Indian deeds of the same period. The very different circumstances in the New Netherland, 
Massachusetts Bay, and Plymouth Colonies make an analysis of the Dutch-Indian deeds 
expedient. There is, however, an admitted overlap between some of the colonies’ dealings 
with local Indians. For that reason, and for a lack of exclusive Dutch-deed work, many studies 
of Anglo-Indian land transfers have been cited as references in this work.  
Reservations about “Indian Deeds” in the Academy  
In the past, scholars have been unwilling to give “Indian deeds” serious analytical 
consideration in spite of their potential to shed light on Indian social norms, land tenure, 
and their interactions with Europeans. As Robert S. Grumet, a prominent scholar of Euro-
                                                 
“diverse peoples adjust their differences through…a process of creative…misunderstandings. [They] try to 
persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what they perceive to be the values and 
practices of those others.” The mélange of surface commonalities (for neither group can fully understand the 
culture of the other) is the progenitor of a new tradition of “shared meanings and practices” between the two 
peoples. See Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x. 
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Munsee land transactions, puts it, they “have been loathe to rely upon…deed data to go 
beyond brief statements concerning the process of Indian land alienation, European real 
estate procedures, and Native land tenure concepts.”4 Though he made that observation in 
1978, it is still not obsolete in 2017; there are comparatively few studies in existence that 
focus on interpreting Indian deeds. Most of the existing ones have been in print for decades. 
They either deal with regional subsets of the Anglo-Indian deeds or combine all the deeds 
made by one Indian people with English, Dutch, and Swedish peoples, reading across 
empires and cultures, and over larger timespans. No dedicated study of the Dutch-Indian 
deeds of the seventeenth century exists. This is most likely due to scholarly contempt for the 
documents; it is time to revisit this scholarly cynicism and assess its foundations. 
Though scholars’ reasons for hesitating to use these documents are not unfounded, 
some of them are only partly valid. It is important to examine all the problematic aspects of 
Indian deeds before proceeding with the study.  
Falsification is the greatest potential peril of the Indian deeds, and an entirely 
appropriate cause for caution. Examining Anglo-Indian land deeds in seventeenth-century 
Maine, Emerson W. Baker noted that “The face or suggestion of forgery makes them 
potentially unreliable source materials,” along with a host of other complications particular 
to their registration in isolated, English-controlled Maine.
5
 Among the Dutch cohort of 
deeds, the one documenting the infamous 1629 purchase of Manhattan Island from its 
                                                 
4
 Robert S. Grumet, “An Analysis of Upper Delawaran Land Sales in Northern New Jersey, 1630-1758,” in 
Papers of the Ninth Algonquian Conference, ed. William Cowan (Ottawa, 1978), 25. 
5
 Emerson W. Baker, “‘A Scratch with a Bear’s Paw’: Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine,” Ethnohistory 
36:3 (summer, 1989): 236-237. 
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inhabitants for 60 guilders in trade goods has long been determined to be a forgery likely 
created in 1677.
6
 Though such a finding is cause for caution, it is important to note that no 
other Dutch deeds have been exposed as such in the existing scholarship on Dutch-Indian 
relations and on Indian land transfers. In his own study, Baker concluded that, “While only 
half of [the 56 surviving Indian deeds for the Sagadahoc region] can be verified…most of the 
rest appear to be legitimate.”7 Grumet also notes that contemporaneous fraud seems to have 
been uncommon, since Native peoples were quite aware of the extent of their territories and 
what they were selling: 
Native proprietors…rarely sold identical areas to different European purchasers, 
though different Native persons often claimed, and received compensation for 
identical tracts over a period of years. Legal documents and contemporary accounts 
indicate that fraud was often detected, and thus of relatively rare occurrence.
8
 
 
Indian deeds might be fraudulent in less direct ways. Writing about Dutch-Mahican 
land transactions, William A. Starna argues that, though “the language of the deeds in nearly 
all cases adheres to a form or style, a legal protocol, that is remarkably consistent and thus, 
on its face, transparent,” it is “little understood…to what extent the Indian ‘proprietors’ were 
told of the precise wording in a deed, deeds that in all likelihood they could not read for 
themselves.” Starna also mentions Francis Jennings, a scholar with a more explicit stance 
                                                 
6
 Paul Otto confirms this in footnote no. 65 of “Trade and Settlement,” the third chapter of his book, The 
Dutch-Munsee Encounter in America: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Hudson Valley (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2006), 104. Robert S. Grumet gives the approximate date of the forgery’s creation in his 
book, The Munsee Indians: A History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 49. 
7
 Baker, 237.  
8
 Grumet, “Analysis,” 27-28. 
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against the documents, correctly saying that he “see[s] little more than trickery and fraud in 
the land transfers that took place in colonial New England.”9  
There are other scholars, however, who dismiss the theory that linguistic barriers and 
illiteracy were used to take advantage of Indians in land conveyances. Grumet addresses the 
issue directly: 
Some scholars have noted that accidental or deliberate mistranslations may have 
interfered with Native understanding of the terms of many land conveyances. Prince 
(1912) and Goddard (1971) have, however, brought attention to the widespread use 
of a trade jargon by both the Upper Delawarans and their European and Native 
neighbors. Created and utilized for international commerce and diplomacy, the 
jargon usually conveyed full understanding to the parties to the deeds.
10
 
 
Starna seems to agree with Grumet’s point as he analyzes the land transactions between 
Mahicans, the English, and the Dutch, calling “the widespread use of a trade jargon…an 
important mitigating factor.”11  
Though she does not discuss land transfers, Lois Feister’s early work shows that the 
Dutch and the Indians made efforts to communicate with increasing nuance as their 
relationships became more complex. Feister explains that the potential economic rewards of 
the fur trade gave the Dutch and Indians incentive to communicate effectively from the very 
beginning. She states that “from 1609 to at least 1638,” “a type of trade jargon on the Indian 
                                                 
9
 William A. Starna, From Homeland to New Land: A History of the Mahican Indians, 1600-1830 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 111. In the latter quote, Starna is referencing pages 128-145 of Francis 
Jennings’ book, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1975). 
10
 Grumet, “Analysis,” 27. 
11
 Starna, Homeland, 111. 
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languages developed...[that was] quite adequate for the simple day-to-day bartering that 
occurred.”12 She also points out that  
The new problems [between the Dutch and the Indians] after 1640, caused by 
agricultural colonization combined directly with the continued fur trade, included a 
need for better communication which a simple trade jargon could not fulfill. Men 
who knew the various Indian languages as more than simple trade jargons 
consequently came into demand as more or less official interpreters for the rest.
13
  
 
Ives Goddard’s later work on the use of the so-called Delaware Jargon by colonists in New 
Sweden supports Feister’s points. He explains that the Swedes adopted that particular trade 
jargon on their arrival in the 1630s because it was “already firmly established as the medium 
of communication between the Indians and the Dutch throughout New Netherland” and 
probably learned it from the many Dutchmen in their numbers. He also describes its 
probable provenance among the Dutch: “the jargon the Dutch used was based on the 
language of the Delaware River [because the] first permanent Dutch settlements [in Delaware 
territory] were on the [River].” These had been established in the 1620s at Fort Nassau on 
the eastern bank of the Delaware River and Fort Wilhemus on Burlington Island, but the 
Dutch West India Company (WIC)
14
 ordered them to move and concentrate on Manhattan 
                                                 
12
 Lois M. Feister, “Linguistic Communication between the Dutch and Indians in New Netherland, 1609-1664,” 
Ethnohistory 20:1 (1973): 31. 
13
 Ibid., 35. 
14
 The Dutch West India Company’s Dutch name is “de Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie,” which 
translates to “the Chartered West-Indian Company.” It is commonly abbreviated as WIC. 
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Island for financial and security reasons in 1626.
15
 The settlers brought the Delaware Jargon 
to New Amsterdam with them.
16
  
It is important to remember, though, that this “Jargon” was just that—a reduced form 
of an Indian language. Anthony F. Buccini believes that true bilinguals were rare through the 
whole period of New Netherland’s existence, since “full acquisition of [Indian] languages, in 
the context of frontier life, by an adult speaker of a typologically radically different language, 
[as Germanic Dutch was from, say, Algonquian Mahican,] is virtually impossible.”17 Buccini 
argues that Indians were aware that their new trade partners would not be able to achieve 
fluency in their languages and thus played “an active, perhaps very conscious and intentional, 
                                                 
15
 A 1626 Mohawk attack on Fort Orange’s commander, Daniel van Krieckenbeeck, who “had been assisting 
the Mahicans in an attack on the Mohawks” during the Mohawk-Mahican War (1626-1628), prompted then-
Director General Peter Minuit to order “all personnel from outlying areas to gather for safety on Manhattan 
Island, leaving only a skeleton presence behind at Fort Orange [for the fur trade]” and possibly retaining Fort 
Nassau as a semi-permanent trading post, since the latter was located on the eastern bank of the Delaware 
River and poorly situated for fur trading with the Lenapes. See “Fort Nassau,” under “Delaware,” in “A Tour 
of New Netherland,” the New Netherland Institute, accessed 23 February 2017, 
http://www.newnetherlandinstitute.org/history-and-heritage/digital-exhibitions/a-tour-of-new-
netherland/delaware/fort-nassau/; “Albany Region Overview,” under “Albany Region,” in “A Tour of New 
Netherland, accessed 23 February 2017, http://www.newnetherlandinstitute.org/history-and-heritage/digital-
exhibitions/a-tour-of-new-netherland/albany/; Mark Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-
Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 275-276; and Bruce G. Trigger, 
“The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624-28): The Establishment of a Pattern,” Canadian Historical Review 52:3 
(September, 1971): 279 and 281. Note: Another Fort Nassau, built on the Hudson River in 1614 and 
abandoned by 1617 predates the WIC and the eponymous Delaware fort. See “Fort Nassau,” under “Albany 
Region,” in “A Tour of New Netherland,” the New Netherland Institute, accessed 17 February 2017, 
http://www.newnetherlandinstitute.org/history-and-heritage/digital-exhibitions/a-tour-of-new-
netherland/albany/fort-nassau/; Shirley W. Dunn, The Mohicans and Their Land, 1609-1730 (Fleischmanns, 
NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1994), 72-75; Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of 
the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1992), 88; Charles T. Gehring, “Hodie Mihi, Cras Tibi: Swedish-Dutch Relations in the Delaware Valley,” in 
New Sweden in America, ed. Carol E. Hoffecker et al. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995), 70; 
Meuwese, Brothers, 118-121; and Trigger, 279. 
16
 Ives Goddard, “The Delaware Jargon,” in New Sweden in America, ed. Carol E. Hoffecker et al. (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1995), 138, 143, 142. 
17
 Anthony F. Buccini, “Swannekens Ende Wilden: Linguistic Attitudes and Communication Strategies among 
the Dutch and Indians in New Netherland,” in The Low Countries and the New World(s): Travel, Discovery, 
Early Relations, ed. Johanna C. Prins et al (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000), 17 and 23. 
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role in the development of ‘pidginized’ or reduced forms of their languages for use with the 
Europeans.”18 Indians who acquired some Dutch similarly learned a reduced form of it, 
though only to a small extent, since they were not incorporated into Dutch colonial society 
and since they could not reasonably be expected to learn the language of such a seemingly 
small and impermanent group.
19
 As Buccini explains, “in the absence of widespread 
bilingualism…Europeans and Indians bridged the linguistic divide primarily through the use 
of pidginized varieties of the Indian languages and, in the later period around areas of 
relatively dense settlement, perhaps through reduced forms of Dutch.”20 These abridged 
versions of languages, by definition, were limited, lacking the full range of nuances of their 
parent tongues; however, they successfully packed all the necessaries of communication 
between business and political partners into a functional, accessible package. 
In his book, The Munsee Indians: A History, Grumet also makes the important 
point that ritual could surpass direct translation in conveying meaning in these complex cross-
cultural transactions. As he argues: 
Even if both parties did not exactly understand everything written or said, the 
endlessly repeated structure of deed contents and the ceremonial readings and 
signings of deed documents composed what can be thought of as a ritual formula. 
Literate or illiterate [which many Dutch colonists also were, as evidenced by the 
frequent appearance of marks next to their names], Indian or colonist, all people in 
colonial America were attuned to the nuances of social etiquette, political procedure, 
and religious ceremony. Respect for proper performance of reading and signing 
rituals during land deals went far in assuring all parties that appropriate ceremonies 
and forms were being observed. It is unlikely that many would casually overlook or 
unquestioningly countenance omissions of particular parts of these rituals or 
alterations in their order of presentation.
21
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 21-22. 
19
 Ibid., 17-18 and 21. 
20
 Ibid., 17. 
  
21
 Grumet, Munsee, 87-88. 
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Further, Grumet reminds us that when early misunderstandings over land did occur, their 
consequences were probably disseminated through Native communication networks. “Such 
information,” he explains, “travelled quickly through the Upper Delawaran groups, and 
misunderstandings of such magnitude could not have survived many signings.”22 Thus, literal 
misunderstandings are unlikely to have been influential factors in Dutch-Indian land 
transactions beyond the earliest dates. 
Another concern, if a given deed is not an eighteenth or nineteenth-century 
fabrication and the purchase was legitimately made (with proper translation and delineation 
of the tract to be alienated), is that the Indian signatories could have been random persons 
not authorized to sell the land at all. William A. Starna is a proponent of this perspective. 
He does not believe that there is any way to prove that the Indians named in the extant deeds 
were really entitled to part with the land or that they truly understood that they were parting 
with it in the broad European sense of permanently alienating it by sale. Starna argues that, 
“Once fully considered, there is little to support the notion that Mahicans ‘owned’ land in 
the region, either before or after contact,” though he concedes that “What did matter is that 
the Dutch wanted to purchase land in accordance with the prevailing law and that the 
Mahicans made themselves available to sell it to them.”23 
The reappearance of certain names in the documents works against this hypothesis. 
Though the inconsistency in European spellings of Indian names makes it impossible to 
                                                 
22
 Grumet, “Analyzing,” 26-27. 
23
 Starna, Homeland, chap. 7 and p. 117. 
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confirm beyond a doubt that two names with a similar sound/spelling refer to the same 
person, reasonable associations can be made.
24
 Discussing the wide Hudson Valley kinship 
ties that allowed people to “move among distinctive political organizations [with apparent 
ease],” Tom Arne Midtrød noted the possible connection between the Esopus man, 
“Captain Jan Bachter,” who sold Mahican territory…[to the English] in…1683,” to the 
“Catskill Mahican leader Onekeek…called Jan de Backer by the Dutch.” He concluded that  
Even if he was not…Onekeek, [the name] is a sign that he had ties to the Mahicans. 
It is possible that the purchasers simply acquired a deed from a man with no right to 
sell, but then it is peculiar that they made sure to record Jan Bachter’s Esopus 
background, which left this transaction open to challenges from anyone familiar with 
the Valley’s Native territorial boundaries.25 
 
Grumet has managed to make more concrete connections by using other documents 
that “[identify] aliases…[and] not[e] marriages and other relationships” where possible. 
Analyzing the names on the 600 deeds signed by Mahicans and Munsees from 1630 to 1779, 
he identified “207 individual signatories comprising more than 2,700 names in the sample.” 
He explained that “Many of these individuals appear in two or three deeds and then 
disappear…[though] more prominent leaders…put their marks upon many land 
conveyances.”26 In his subsequent book, The Munsee Indians: A History, he updated this 
finding, stating that “at least 210 prominent Munsee individuals and several hundred other 
signatories ultimately conveyed the whole of their lands to colonists [over the 150-year 
                                                 
24
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25
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26
 Loc cit. 
 
 13 
 
period].”27 These names repeated over time attest to Dutch and English recognition of Indian 
social hierarchies in purchasing land from them. Additionally, the fact that such names only 
appear within a small chronological window, never to be seen again in the record, bolsters 
their legitimacy: Munsee peoples did not recycle the names of their dead, at least until a very 
long period had elapsed. In fact, Herbert C. Kraft notes that “People did not say that person’s 
name ever again because it would bring sadness to the family.”28 
Others analyze the names without addressing such a concern. In her book, The 
Mohicans and Their Land, 1609-1730, Shirley W. Dunn takes the names and the social and 
political positions that often accompany them in deeds at face-value. She analyzes Dutch 
nicknames given to some signers and the pictorial marks that Indians affixed to the deeds, 
noting that Mohican “chief sachem Aepjen signed several deeds, usually as a witness.”29 
Further, she construes reappearing marks of a similar design as possibly “tribal, clan, or 
family related, [possibly] represent[ing] group commitments rather than individual names,” 
though she does admit that there was “only occasionally repetition of the same mark by one 
person from one deed to another.”30 Dunn also devotes a chapter to a history of important 
Mahican leaders, partly tracing their eras of leadership through the appearance of their 
names on deeds and then aligning them with mentions in other primary source documents.
31
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28
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The consistency in the names of certain sachems in Dutch-Indian deeds and Dutch 
documentation of peace treaties indicates that the signatories are unlikely to have been 
random Indians bribed into selling “their” land in return for trade goods or alcohol. For 
example, Aepjen was one of the sachems mentioned in the meeting held on August 30
th
, 
1645, to conclude a peace between “the Dutch and the River [Delaware] Indians,” with the 
Mohawks acting as mediators:  
This day…appeared before the director and council in Fort Amsterdam, in the 
presence of the entire community, the following sachems or chiefs of the Indians, as 
well for themselves as in the capacity of attorneys of the neighboring chiefs, to wit: 
Oratany, chief of Achkinckeshacky…as also Aepjen personally, speaking for the 
Wappincx, Wlquaeskeckx, Sintsings and Kichtawanghs.
32
  
 
As mentioned before, Aepjen also signed many deeds, and it is very unlikely that he was a 
made-up or unauthorized person. Dunn even notes that Indian marks on deeds were often 
blotchy and shaky, indicating that the signer was inexperienced with Dutch writing 
implements and probably not a European imposter.
33
  
There was foul play in some of these transactions. To the forged deed for Manhattan 
Island and unknown instances of fraud detected soon enough to be erased from the record, 
we can add Andrew Lipman’s broad comment that “It is true that white land agents…lied 
about their deeds’ terms and tried to garner the signatures of intoxicated or unauthorized 
sellers.” Lipman goes on to say that “Chicanery and coercion were certainly part of the 
process, but seldom blatant,”34 and launches into a very nuanced interpretation of the third 
                                                 
32
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and final deed for the purchase of Staten Island, signed in 1670 by its European and Native 
inhabitants. The key word here is “tried,” and specificity is critical. By the 1670s, the English 
had gained a strong foothold in the Northeast, and though the Dutch would briefly retake 
their colony from 1673 to 1674, it was clear to Native peoples that they would have to deal 
with the English alone for the foreseeable future. The power dynamic was much more 
complex during the Dutch period, and it translated into more leverage in land sales than 
would exist after New Netherland became New York. In spite of that reality, Lipman 
uncovered collaboration and Indian consent in the 1670 sale, because military strength was 
not the sole factor at play even as Indian power declined in the Northeast.  
The Dutch transactions occurred earlier, with a European power that had a much 
more tenuous presence in the area than the English, and with an array of Indian peoples that 
were both in a vulnerable position near encroaching settlement (including the very residents 
of Staten Island) and a very influential position. Cantwell and Wall note that “As more Dutch 
settlers arrived, some no longer…clustered their settlements around the trading post at Fort 
Orange. Instead, they settled in isolated farmsteads,”35 where they were vulnerable to attack. 
There were not many alternatives in a sparsely populated colony that was attempting to 
develop agriculturally. Finding individuals who were authorized to alienate land was crucial 
to gaining Indian support in the subsequent use of new property. Dutchmen could get 
unidentified people to sign suspect documents, but budding settlements would undergo an 
ordeal to maturity, especially because “All the Dutch settlements were surrounded by Indian 
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country.”36 Indeed, unwanted settlements in the Esopus region between Fort Orange and 
New Amsterdam were razed until matters were resolved. Examining transfers of Penacook-
Pawtucket land to the English, Peter S. Leavenworth concluded that “Legal 
imperatives…provided two…reasons for seeking Indian consent: social custom and 
protection from challenges to one’s title. A third motivation…was fear of violent retaliation.”37 
It should also be remembered that the Dutch officials in New Netherland had 
authorities to answer to in Amsterdam, which helped to insure a degree of honesty in the 
internal records of the WIC, a profit-seeking joint-stock company. The WIC shareholders 
demanded detailed records of the goings-on in the colony and especially of financial 
transactions over decades of operation. Just a brief look through the court minutes of 
Rensselaerswijck shows that every stuyver
38
 of gifts or payment to the Indians seems to have 
been accounted for: “For 30 rapier blades…presented to the chiefs [sometime between 1648 
and 1649]…30:--:-- [florins]…For purchase of the kill called Papenakick and expenses, 
disbursed and paid 264:--:-- [florins]…The purchase and expenses of…Katskil…1239:4:-- 
[florins]…The purchase of Klaverrack amounts to 653:9:-- [florins]…39  
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The WIC also had strict policies concerning indigenous peoples in New Netherland: 
one of the first commands given to the colony’s second Director General, Willem Verhulst 
(1625-1626), was that “he pay the Indians for lands which he intended to colonize [and that] 
Land cessions were…to be voluntary.”40 This command was repeated more than once, 
showing its importance to the Company’s members. On January 12, 1630, Kiliaen van 
Rensselaer, a WIC shareholder and founder of the WIC-authorized patroonship of 
Rensselaerswijck, was very specific, covering all his bases, when he instructed Bastiaen 
Ianssen Crol, “commis at Fort Orange,” to 
try to buy the lands hereafter named for the said Rensselaer, from the Mahijcans, 
Maquaas or such other nations as have any claim to them, giving them no occasion 
for discontent, but treating them with all courtesy and discretion…In case he can not 
purchase the said lands from one or two nations, that he purchase the same from all 
who pretend any right to them. Having bought the islands, that he convene not only 
the respective chiefs but all the people, in order to make the payment in the presence 
of them all, and that he takes then the chief of each nation to the island of the 
Manhates to confirm the purchase before the director and council, and that he have 
the same recorded among the resolutions and send me a copy.
41
 
 
 On the other hand, the fact that the Company had a definite profit motive and much 
to gain from large-scale land acquisition at low prices must be factored in. This economic 
driving force can be felt throughout the documentary record. For example, the “30 rapier 
blades…presented to the chiefs,” accounted for under a section called “Receipts” for the 
years 1648 and 1649, were described as “broad, rusted and not merchantable…valued at one 
guilder [/florin] each.” By comparison, a few entries above, under the same section, colonists 
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Henrick Backer, Jan Thomas, and Volckert Jans “furnished [the Company with] 5 rapier 
blades at fl. 2-10 each,” valued at “12:10 [florins.]”42 Thus financially contextualized, 30 
florins in unsellable rapier blades seems an exceedingly fair price to pay for good relations 
and very profitable continued fur trading with neighboring Indian polities through 
participation in their rituals of reciprocity. The WIC had to give such gifts at fairly regular 
intervals or conflict would ensue, with Indians plundering European settlements to restore 
physical and cosmic equilibrium. Just as importantly, conflict would bring a costly slowdown 
in trade. The WIC, unable to avoid this important ritual, tried to keep a strict budget for 
“gifts for the Indians,” though it was not always successful.  
 When it comes to land specifically, there is evidence to suggest that the WIC made 
intense efforts to get the best deal possible, as one expects a private business operation to do. 
They were already fortunate that land was nowhere near close to being in short supply, which 
naturally depressed its prices, and that, at least in the beginning, what interested Indian 
proprietors were relatively affordable trade goods
43
 and wampum.
44
 Still, the WIC sought the 
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best bargain possible even within this scenario, at the expense of Indians, Dutch settlers (by 
trying to prevent individual settlers from purchasing land directly from Indians)
45
, and also 
the neighboring English and Swedish colonies with which they had disputes over land and 
boundaries.  
Where Indians are concerned, while it can be said that the WIC and individual 
Dutch settlers simply offered indigenous peoples the articles that they prized most in return 
for their land, neither were they transparent about how land was priced and paid for among 
their own people. A section of a 1660 letter from Jan Baptist van Rensselaer to Jeremias van 
Rensselaer proves the definite existence of the intent on the WIC’s part to hide the full 
potential sale price of land to the Dutch from Indian proprietors: 
There is…a misunderstanding about your having given [some colonists] permission 
to purchase at their own expense from the Indians the small island in front of their 
door, for they have already bought nearly the whole of it from the Indians and they 
have thereby put the Indians wise as to the [value of the] land, for they had to buy it 
from the Indians at the highest price and had to give them fully as much for it as the 
whole of Pasecanees Island has cost, so that already several Indians have come to me 
and stated that they wished to return the goods for which they had sold their land so 
cheaply. Among them den Uyl [/Stichtigeri] was one of the foremost, on account of 
the island opposite the fort, which he wished to have back, so that we are likely to 
have much trouble yet with that beast.
46
 
 
In this brief excerpt of a much longer letter, one can hear a tone of serious concern over 
Indian ex-proprietors discovering how much they could have convinced the Dutch to pay for 
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their real estate. Judging by it and the date of the letter, 1660, only four years before the 
colony would cease to exist as a Dutch domain, one can guess that this crafty omission of 
information had gone on for quite some time.  
Another piece of evidence to this effect is found in the response from Stuyvesant and 
the Council of New Netherland to “the humble remonstrance and petition of the colonies 
and villages in this New Netherland Province” presented to them in 1653. One of the 
concerns of the petitioners was that they lived in fear that “a new war will again be started by 
the natives of this country, [because of] the murders they have committed under the pretext 
that they have not been paid for their lands.” The reply of the Director General and Council 
was as follows: 
May God grant that the English and those of Dutch nationality give no cause or 
inducement to a new and feared war with the natives, whether it be by showing too 
much fear of them or by cheating them or by telling them, among other things, what 
a morgen of land is worth to the English and Dutch, whereby the natives then 
conclude that they formerly had sold their land too cheaply. It could well happen 
that they might express dissatisfaction, claiming that they had not received full value.
47
 
 
Stuyvesant then went on to say that the Indians were not attacking due to land-related 
grievances and that such an allegation was “made entirely without foundation and in bad 
faith.” He then explained that the murders recently committed by them stemmed from the 
belief that that “Moolyn [Cornelius Melyn, a settler and patroon of the Staten Island colony 
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from 1641 to 1655,]
48
 is a sorcerer, that he has poisoned them, that he has sold [them] bad 
powder and guns and so forth; consequently, the Indians from the south have all sworn to 
kill him and all the people on Staten Island.”49 Regardless of what occasioned the murders,50 
it is clear that there were real efforts made to reveal as little as possible about the value that 
land held in Dutch and broader European culture. 
But the most important reason for regarding the deeds with chariness is the notion 
that differences in Indian and European conceptions of land tenure prevented the former 
from fully understanding the implications of these documents to the latter, in spite of good 
translations, ritualistic repetition, or any number of “safeguards.” There are a range of 
theories about Algonquian and Iroquoian Indians’ territoriality, from the idea that they had 
no conception of property in land to the assertion that sachems had long used the transfer 
of land to strengthen political alliances. The most widely accepted theory, however, is that 
these peoples were indeed territorial, but that their ownership of land was communal and 
usufruct—that is, small subgroups/villages “owned” the land that they were using until they 
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moved to a new location, at which point it became available for others within the greater tribe 
to use.
51
 Indian land tenure will be explained in more detail in chapter three, but suffice it to 
say that many scholars believe that there is no way that Amerindian peoples could have 
understood what European fee simple, non-usufruct ownership and individual freehold 
entailed when they had never encountered it.
52
 They would have, thus, had a rude awakening, 
finding that they were not allowed back on land that they had sold even if it was not in use at 
the time, or that that they had not asked for enough goods or wampum in payment since the 
transfer held such permanence to the buyers.  
Many points can be made that dilute (though not completely overturn) what Grumet 
has termed the “misunderstanding hypothesis.” First, if Indian sellers did misunderstand the 
terms of the agreements initially, they were not fooled for long, quickly catching on. 
Leavenworth argues that “By the mid-1600s, every Indian had known for years how the 
English used the land they acquired…Most Indians well comprehended the implications of 
their land sales.”53 Examining Anglo-Abenaki deeds in Maine, Baker makes the concurring 
                                                 
51
 Starna, Homeland, 106-107; Charles A. Bishop, “Territoriality among Northeastern Algonquians,” 
Anthropologica 28:1/2 (1986): 40-42; Midtrød, Memory, 72-73; Tom Arne Midtrød, “Native American 
Landholding in the Colonial Hudson Valley,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 37:2 (2013): 90-
94; Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century 
America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; New York State Historical Association, 1993), 152; Paul Otto, The 
Dutch-Munsee Encounter in America: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Hudson Valley (New York: Beghahn 
Books, 2006), 97; and Amy C. Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 31-40; Leavenworth, 281-282; Grumet, Munsee, 84 and 
86; and Siminoff, 114-115. Note: Some of the disagreement among scholars can be attributed to different 
conceptions of the meaning of property in land. Starna, for example, acknowledges communal and even 
kinship-based usufruct ownership but does not consider them to constitute any sense of ownership because he 
construes “property”/“landholding”/“ownership” as strictly European/Western conceptions. 
52
 These scholars say that Indians thought that they were granting European buyers (temporary) usufruct rights 
or shared use of the land rather than private title to it. See Otto, 97; Schutt, 31-33; and Midtrød, Memory, 72; 
Midtrød, “Native,” 93. 
53
 Leavenworth, 298. 
 23 
 
point that, “Although it is possible that Indians did not completely comprehend the English 
concept of exclusive ownership, [the] clauses in deeds guaranteeing continued native use of 
the land argue otherwise.”54  
Second, the existence of commonalities between European and Indian conceptions 
of land tenure also makes it probable that Indians understood the transaction more than 
previous scholars have imagined. Grumet outlines the similarities between European and 
Lenape peoples, for example: “Both peoples…believed that they held land in trust for spirits. 
European[s]…in the name of God by ‘Divine Right[,]’ [and] Lenapes…for the Great Spirit, 
Kishelemukunk…[They] felt intensely spiritual connections with the land [in spite of 
Europeans’ stronger regard for it as a commodity].” Both cultures also designated lands for 
common use, Europeans through common pastures and Indians through hunting reserves. 
Most importantly, both peoples had developed customs around “territorial transfer,” since 
they both “required formal transfers of title [to it].”55 Faren R. Siminoff points out that  
like their English counterparts, the Indians…acknowledged several forms of 
individual land allotment and rights to land…The sachem could allot land to 
commoners, kinsmen, or loyal followers. He could make such an allotment for life 
or attach hereditary rights to it. He could demand a single payment or a series of 
payments, and he could revoke the allotment and reallocate the resource.
56
 
 
Andrew Lipman takes this point further, boldly asserting that, while “it is true that Natives 
and Europeans had drastically different uses for land…the idea that Natives were incapable 
of seeing land as a transferable property is a kind of Noble Savage hokum that insists Indians 
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had a spiritual reverence for every square inch of soil, and thus barely made a mark on the 
earth…[and that] erases thousands of years of actual indigenous land use.”57 
Beyond preexisting similarities in land tenure, Leavenworth finds evidence of the two 
groups making efforts to find such common ground, which is just as important: seventeenth-
century Massachusetts deeds make mention of agreements being sealed by the “medieval 
English practice” of “turf and twig,” in which “the interested parties met for a brief ceremony 
during which the seller handed the buyer a clump of stick from the land being sold.” He 
believes that this simple, ritualistic agreement likely predated written deeds in the area and 
that it probably “appealed to English and Indian alike.”58 The lack of a formal written deed 
(or mention of it) for Manhattan Island, the first purchase the Dutch made, suggests that a 
similar kind of simple puzzle-piecing of related concepts and rituals around land was at work 
among the Dutch and their newfound trade partners as well. 
Baker finds support for these ideas, noting that Kennebec Indians’ complaints to the 
English in 1677 were very specific, but that they included “none about land transactions.”59 
It is important to listen to Native voices where they appear in interpreting these sales. A broad 
look at the texts of Dutch treaties and meetings with their neighbors shows that Indians 
complained repeatedly about cattle encroachment, murders, assault of fur traders coming 
into town, and sales of alcohol to their people. Misunderstandings about land sales, on the 
other hand, are only occasionally referenced in the documentary record, and they usually 
take the form of officials complaining that Indian sellers were reselling land or alleging that 
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certain tracts had not actually been purchased. For example, in an “[e]xtract of the general 
letter from New Netherland dated October 30, 1655, signed by Petrus Stuyvesant, Nicasius 
de Sille, [and] La Montaigne,” the writers complained that “purchase and conveyances” from 
Indians were not the best way to defend their claims on the Delaware/South River from the 
Swedes, since “…the savages…sell as often as there appear purchasers…”60 
In New Netherland, there was never an instance of complete denial that a transfer 
had occurred. Instead, Indians questioned the size of the parcel in question, taking advantage 
of the very real potential for misunderstanding between two different cultures and the 
vagueness of some documented land transactions to get a better deal. Even the defeated 
Esopus, who had technically ceded their all their lands in 1660 as part of a peace treaty 
following the eponymous war, alleged that a “second large piece of land was not 
comprehended in the peace.” Though a second, conclusive war61 between the two parties 
eventually broke out again, the WIC was compelled to “[give] satisfaction for the second 
large piece in dispute.” They made a compensatory present to the Esopus in May of 1663, 
though no formal deed was drafted.
62
 
More often, Indians tried to extract further payment from their Dutch buyers to make 
a transaction fairer when they found that they had been underpaid. When they complained 
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directly about insufficient payment, as in the instance noted earlier, the complaints seem to 
have quickly set a resolution in motion. The remnants of a document from the 1652-1654 
council minutes relate such an instance that occurred in 1652: a colonist named Jan 
Schnediger approached one of the members of the Council demanding 500 guilders that he 
had promised to certain Indians in payment for their land in “the Flat Bush.” He was very 
concerned, “saying, among other things, that the losses and damages hereafter [caused] by 
the natives” would be the Council’s fault. It is evident that this man’s concern was very real 
and not a mere excuse to extort money from the Company: he was reportedly “pleased to 
address [the Council] in a most insulting manner,” his “words…shouted so loud that everyone 
could hear them” when proof of purchase and information on the qualities of the land were 
demanded.
63
 
In fact, the next few lines reveal that Jan had brought this matter up once before. The 
Council had apparently stalled in consenting to pay, with the following musings: 
Is it expedient and advantageous to encourage and embolden the Indians to the point 
that the lands have to be bought and paid for again because of their 
threats[?]…Would it not lead to serious consequences, if it can be proved, that there 
is in the midst of the purchased land some which has not been bought (although we 
are not quite convinced of it), or what would be the consequences of the situation if 
we gave a small gift to the Indians? Would not their wicked and insatiable avarice 
take advantage of it and consider it as an inducement to murder more Christians, 
imagining them to be fainthearted, and threaten a massacre so that later on they may 
again obtain money and goods for another piece of wild and waste land?
64
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In these words, the desire to remain tough and to drive a hard bargain through to the end, 
in spite of Indian military power and threats, is palpable. One also hears frustration. The 
thought of a dwindling profit margin stung. Land that had been acquired at a bargain became 
more expensive through repurchase. But the frustration also seems to be caused by a cultural 
disconnect:  
Concerning these points I was somewhat in doubt whether the Indians had a better 
claim to the wild and waste bush, upon which God and nature had grown trees, than 
any other Christian people, and what proof and assurance could be produced that 
the Indians had a better right and title to this parcel of land than other Indians, even 
more than the greatest sachem or chiefs who a long time ago had sold, given and 
ceded the whole piece of land and its dependencies…and received according to the 
declaration of the late director and council satisfactory payment for it in goods.
65
 
 
There is exasperation over the realization that the Dutch ultimately depended on the word 
of their Indian neighbors that they were the true owners of a given parcel of land when 
making a purchase. This seems to come from two ideas central to Dutch and broad 
European land tenure: the idea that owned land should show very specific signs of human 
presence—cleared fields, permanent houses, cattle, etc.; and the notion that ownership was 
backed not only by social affirmation, but by written documents notarized by an official 
entity. If one moves past the moment of ethnocentrism at the beginning of the passage, one 
can see in its extrapolation that a cultural and conceptual confusion about how land 
ownership was manifested in Indian cultures genuinely complicated these transactions. 
 In spite of the Company’s definite desire to come out ahead in land dealings, the 
presence of a conceptual blind spot often gave way to acquiescence, especially since Indian 
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peoples were not docile or gullible neighbors. In Jan’s case, the Council ultimately decided 
to pay up: 
Nevertheless, (although it was improper and contrary to all reason and equity) we 
agreed, for the sake of preventing blame and new troubles, to allow the aforesaid Jan 
Snediger recently to give or promise to the Indians a gift and make a report to us so 
that we might compensate him in due time; however, we never thought, much less 
expressly ordered him, to promise such a large sum at our expense or the expense 
of the Company for such a small piece of land...
66
  
 
One can hear them rationalizing this reluctant concession, but it was made nonetheless, and 
it shows the reality that the Dutch needed to meet their neighbors somewhere in the middle 
to be able to live in relative harmony with them. As Grumet puts it, “Colonial administrators 
could not…afford to alienate Indians by simply ignoring their demands or rejecting their 
claims out of hand. Instead both parties compromised.”67 
As the previous incidents of misunderstanding show, land issues were never brought 
up in formal records of treaties or official meetings between Indian and Dutch authorities. It 
seems that most Indians did not feel hopeless to correct these clashes in the interpretation 
of land agreements, and that they could resolve them relatively informally as they came up. 
It also suggests that the Dutch righted their wrongs to some acceptable degree and in a timely 
manner when issues were raised. If the words of panicked settlers are to be believed, there 
would have been more turmoil had this not been the case. What is evident is Grumet’s 
insightful comment that “Neither the signatories nor their successors…wound up regarding 
these cessions as unconditional surrenders. All…evidently came to treat them as species of 
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promissory notes guaranteeing exclusive purchase rights to the nation of the colonists signing 
the deeds.”68 Moreover, the presence of these instances of misalignment over land in the 
documentary record show that there was a good measure of integrity in the Dutch record. 
Had the Dutch sought to conceal Indian dissension over previous transfers, they would not 
have mentioned them at all. 
Finally, some scholars also interpret the deeds as possibly forced agreements. 
Discussing Anglo-Indian land transferal in eastern Long Island, Faren R. Siminoff carefully 
declares that “While some competing [native and European territorial] claims were 
extinguished through force of arms, as with the Pequot lands, more typically the goal was 
accomplished through (seemingly) voluntary transactions between the appropriate native and 
settler authorities.”69 The same can be said of the Indian land transfers to the Dutch; only the 
Esopus Indians ceded land after a military defeat; this was done as part of the concessions of 
their peace treaty with the Dutch, which was concluded in 1660, though Holly Rine reminds 
scholars that “This was an agreement that the Esopus did not keep and the WIC was unable 
to enforce.”70 The Esopus did, however, finally cede “all their territory as far inland as the 
two…forts [destroyed during the hostilities]” to the Dutch in 1664, shortly before the English 
takeover of New Netherland in August of that same year (apart, of course, from that other 
large piece mentioned earlier!).
71
  
                                                 
68
 Ibid., 95. 
 
69
 Siminoff, 111. 
70
 Holly Rine, “‘Such Splendid Country,’ The Esopus Region, a Multi-Ethnic Colonial Landscape on the 
Hudson River, 1652-1670,” The Historian (2011): 722. 
71
 Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1960), 168. 
 30 
 
Recent Trends toward Acknowledging Indian Agency in Early Land Transactions 
It must be acknowledged that Northeastern Indians were not on a wholly level playing 
field with the English, Swedish, and Dutch newcomers in these early land transactions, even 
if some of the concerns with the documents discussed above are not as relevant as was once 
thought. While each imperial scenario was unique, Grumet, in his wide-ranging study of 
Munsee land deals with the English and the Dutch, describes “negative reciprocity,” which 
“occurs when one party accepts less for what both parties consider a more valuable 
commodity,” as characteristic of “transactions between Indians and colonists in Munsee 
country throughout the colonial era.”72 He states that  
There was no question that Indians in Munsee country had to part with land they did 
not want to sell after epidemics and military defeats ended their ability to resist 
colonial demands. Knowing that continued resistance would result in the loss of their 
lives as well as their lands, Indians with few other choices decided to sell lands they 
would much rather have kept at prices they knew were much lower than their resale 
value among colonists.
73
 
 
While Grumet’s words hold true for most of the period that his book covers (it ends 
in the late-eighteenth century and even talks about the present day), the Dutch-indigenous 
transactions of the early seventeenth century require a more specific, customized statement. 
The earliest Dutch land purchases from Indians were characterized by something closer to 
Grumet’s “balanced reciprocity,” in which “more or less politically equal parties give and 
receive commodities both regard as equivalent in value.” After that, there was a divergence: 
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Dutch dealings with the Mohawks (part of the Iroquois Confederacy)
74
 and Mahicans
75
 in the 
upper Hudson Valley, who retained their military power and financial power in the form of 
a sufficient supply of beavers, exhibited more respect and balanced reciprocity through to 
Dutch loss of sovereignty. By contrast, Munsee-speaking groups in the lower Hudson Valley 
and Long Island areas experienced negative reciprocity after the 1640s, as Dutch settlement 
expanded and the supply of beavers dwindled.
76
 Dealings in the upper Delaware River Valley 
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with the powerful Susquehannocks
77
 and Munsee-speaking groups
78
 there had a similar tone 
to those at Fort Orange. The region lay at the peripheries of the colony, and the Peach War
79
 
and other attacks in moments of disaffection had made the Dutch careful to maintain 
harmony.
80
 That most of these transactions still look financially unfair to modern eyes is due 
to the limits of cross-cultural conversion they brush up against, which Andrew Lipman calls 
“the real swindle”: 
There was an inherent imbalance when hunting-and-farming gift-centered societies 
that were suffering devastating population losses from disease did business with 
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growing colonial societies connected to a global web of trade that gave them a much 
broader selection of technology and wares.
81
 
 
The lack of a completely level playing field does not, however, preclude the existence of a 
legal and cultural middle ground of give-and-take in these transactions, as the Esopus 
situations examined earlier reveal. In addition to the above-cited counterweights to doubts 
about Indian deeds’ validity as a source for understanding Euro-Indian land transactions, 
there has been a recent trend toward acknowledging Indian agency to a greater extent in 
these exchanges.  
Rather than reading deeds as the product of sly European swindling of the naïve 
“noble savage,” many scholars have found evidence helping to discern Indians’ possible 
motivations for alienating certain tracts to their European neighbors over time and for pricing 
them as they did. As he acknowledges the problematic aspects of these exchanges, Lipman 
explains that “When we calculate prices in European currency, we erase the Native 
perspective on what they were ‘actually’ being paid.”82 Similarly, thinking only in terms of 
European gains in land and Indian losses in it makes for a decontextualized and Eurocentric 
reading of the transfers, one that ignores their essential character of exchange. Exchanges are 
translations by nature; in the case of Indian land, they were also cross-cultural, and must be 
read using both Indian and European tenets. 
As seen above, some scholars have argued that Indian peoples sold land and sold it 
cheaply out of desperation—with the potential for European coercion in mind, and because 
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of their reduced numbers due to epidemic decimation. While these reasons are undoubtedly 
valid in some scenarios, they do not constitute all Indian motives behind land transfers in the 
seventeenth century. As Leavenworth notes, “A framework of collective defeat has been 
applied by historians only with the benefit of hindsight.”83 In fact, Indians had other reasons 
for selling as well; one of the most compelling ones is the procurement of a range of what 
were ultimately short-term gains. Peter A. Thomas, discussing sales to the English in the 
Connecticut River Valley, believes that  
the earliest quitclaims to land…in 1636…stemmed from an attempt by individuals or 
families to place the English in a position where they would feel an obligation to 
reciprocate with equally sociable treatment. The “economic” value of the articles 
received in “payment” may have had far less importance than the social and political 
relationships which they hoped would develop from the transactions.
84
 
 
He also acknowledges the perceived economic advantages of having Europeans settle nearby 
at the time, saying that “The presence of a new English town brought a ready market for 
horticultural produce until the settlers gained…self-sufficiency, as well as a local point of 
exchange for pelts and Western goods.”85 
  A continuing need and desire for European goods in spite of a shrinking fur trade 
was also a factor for some peoples. Thomas notes that starting “in the 1650s…land ceased to 
be a minor supplemental resource in the Indian-English exchange system and became a 
major replacement item for pelts.” Like furs, land provided access to European trade goods 
and wampum. It was the answer for “Indian leaders who relied on the fur trade for goods to 
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bolster their…prestige, or to obtain wampum to foster socio-political alliances between Indian 
communities, and who depended on this exchange as a mechanism to maintain positive 
communications with their English neighbors.”86 Grumet, however, notes that this desire, 
though “an important factor,” was “limited and controlled” in the case of Upper Delawarans, 
as shown by the “measured pace of [their] land sales.” He also adds that “severe paucity of 
marketable commodities” is not a sale catalyst applicable to these particular peoples, since 
they had “many sources of income beyond pelts and land.”87  
 Exploration of Indian land valuation has also uncovered other inducements for 
alienation. Some scholars posit that Indians sold Europeans lands that had depreciated in 
their estimation. Grumet believes that Munsee Indians may have invested land and goods 
with value based on their spiritual power, which was itself based on ritual purity. This is 
opposed to societies that assign “market prices” to it. He asserts that “It is entirely possible 
that Indians may have regarded places vulnerable to military and microbial assaults, denuded 
of game, and ruinously close to Europeans as ritually defiled land that had become…mere 
dirt.”88 Staten Island is an example of a piece of land that Europeans clearly considered 
choice, since they bought it three times before they were finally able to keep it. Local Indians 
seem not to have agreed, for they christened it “Aquehonga Manacknong, a name that likely 
meant ‘the place of bad woods.’”89 European proximity seems to have been strikingly relevant 
as well. Though advantageous for trade, excessive closeness to European settlements could 
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create conflict: Lipman notes that “The Munsees found colonists to be bad neighbors, since 
[their] free-roaming livestock trampled Native cornfields.”90 Grumet himself has found that 
“Only those lands abutting upon already alienated tracts were sold by Native proprietors,”91 
which implies that European nearness impacted desirability.  
 Similarly, Indians’ perception and valuation of European goods cannot be dismissed 
as gullibility. Such an assumption would be disrespectful and inaccurate. Culture provides 
the ultimate lens for appraisal in any community, no matter how absolute and emotionless 
the values derived may seem, and it seems that Indian peoples endowed European goods 
with a lot of value, coming from faraway places and looking as exotic as they did. As Grumet 
points out, “many sources clearly affirm that Indians considered…European trade goods as 
spiritually powerful as wampum.”92 The cultural difference that produced divergence 
between Indian and European estimations of the same goods was powerful enough that it is 
visible in the ways that the two peoples used the items. To a European, a copper kettle was 
simply an everyday cooking tool, used to heat water and cook, and made of a metal that they 
did not regard as precious. Indians, on the other hand, cleaved them into pieces that they 
strung around their necks and wove into clothing for ornamentation and perhaps spiritual 
power.
93
 They used them to cook as well, but the alternative use is evidence of a significantly 
different interpretation occurring, even after Natives had seen the traditional European use 
of the object. Perhaps, beyond ritual purity, a kettle was special for its foreignness; for its 
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possible “alien spirit powers;” or for Indian peoples’ inability to reproduce them because 
they had not developed metallurgy; or for its endurance over a fire.
94
 Dutchmen and Indian 
peoples could only hope to trade what would interest the other party, because things are 
ultimately only worth what someone is willing to give for them at the time. While the reasons 
for Indians’ interest in certain objects may not have interested eager traders long dead, 
historians must now consider them in contextualizing and explaining purchase prices of land. 
 Finally, political advantages (or the potential for them) may also have instigated 
transactions and influenced pricing. Leavenworth notes that “During the first half-century of 
English occupation, [lower Merrimack] Indians…[sold] land they thought expendable at the 
time and for which they secured certain rights of ongoing importance.”95 Grumet similarly 
states that, in signing deeds, Indians sought “legal protection of colonial administrators in 
peacetime and military protection in times of war.” Selling land helped maintain the political 
alliances that provided necessary protection from other powers in a world of constantly 
encroaching boundaries. In return, Europeans secured “the protection of lawful title…[and 
were shielded] from Indian retribution that would surely follow outright seizure of their 
lands.”96 
Though the notion of a level playing field is subjective, it is useful in analyzing early 
Dutch-indigenous land transfers. But both European and Indian yardsticks must be applied 
to this analysis if it is to be fair and accurate. These land transactions were, after all, the 
children of two broad types of cultures coming in contact. 
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Dutch-Indian Land Transfers: Legal and Cultural Middle Grounds  
This chapter has sought to address the problems of source reliability and cross-
cultural equivalency that plague an analysis of the seventeenth-century Dutch-Indian deeds. 
While exposing their problems, it has aimed to explain why these documents can still provide 
valid insights on Dutch-Indian relations and land transactions. Regardless of one’s opinions 
about the transactions and their ostensible consequences for the sellers, the extant Dutch-
indigenous deeds
97
 signed and marked between 1630 and 1664 show clear signs of a legal 
and cultural middle ground between Dutch settlers acting in the name of the WIC and the 
Indian peoples of present-day New York and northern New Jersey.  
This middle ground is manifest in a variety of concessions and alterations that both 
peoples made to their land tenure practices, from the rituals surrounding sales to the 
realization of their terms and conditions, regardless of either people’s designs with the other. 
Its existence is even more apparent when the deeds are viewed alongside contemporaneous 
documents that mention Dutch-Indian affairs generally and the transactions themselves. The 
deeds did not—indeed, could not—represent solely Dutch interests as much as they might 
have tried. Concessions had to be made for the allies and trading partners of the Dutch, even 
in writing. But even those deeds that were a bare-bones exchange of goods for land, with no 
other privileges (like hunting rights) granted to its original owners, show two cultures coming 
together and responding to one another. An Indian deed was not a traditional Dutch 
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document, though it preserved many of the qualities of one. What is more, the signing of a 
deed did not equate to the Dutch having the last word over a piece of land. The Dutch and 
their Indian neighbors were interdependent peoples for different periods of time, and the 
land transactions between them bear the imprint of those entanglements.   
Chapter two will contextualize the seventeenth-century Dutch-Indian land transfers 
by grounding them with an explanation of the different peoples vying for power in the area. 
It will introduce the Dutch presence in the area, their colonizing logic and economic 
orientation, and the formation of the Dutch West India Company. The chapter will also 
discuss the various Indian peoples—Mohawk/Iroquois, Mahican, Munsee, Susquehannock, 
Pequot, Ninnimissinuok, and Huron—in the greater region and their general domestic 
concerns, which undergirded their interests in the Dutch, Swedish, English, and French 
newcomers and influenced their engagement with them over these decades of cohabitation. 
Finally, it will explain the beginnings of Dutch permanent settlement in New Netherland as 
an effort to protect their colonial claims from English usurpation and encroachment. The 
chapter will also go over Dutch and English territoriality and theories of possession, which 
culminated in the Dutch’s direct acknowledgment of Indian title to the land and began the 
process of purchase by deed.  
Chapter three will describe Dutch and Indian land tenures in detail and analyze the 
Dutch-Indian deeds, proving that they are evidence of a uniquely bi-cultural land tenure that 
was conceived by Dutch-indigenous contact and interdependence. Provisions like usufruct 
rights to land and the promise of military protection written into some deeds shows that they 
only look Dutch on the surface. In reality, New Netherland Dutch-Indian deeds are unique 
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documents born of a new world of shared customs and cross-cultural interaction; Indian 
customs had a major part in creating the rituals surrounding Euro-Indian land purchases and 
some of the provisos of their written remains. The chapter will analyze the deeds alongside 
the texts of Dutch-indigenous peace treaties and diplomatic meetings, internal WIC 
correspondence, and other New Netherland legal documents in order to render these 
frontier of land sales, trait by trait. These early land sales were points where divergent 
interests converged, where two very different cultures reached for mutual intelligibility, and 
where Indian agency and power remained conspicuous even when they were signed after the 
Dutch had gained a stronger foothold in the area. 
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CHAPTER II: DUTCH AND INDIAN INTERESTS IN EARLY NEW 
NETHERLAND 
 This chapter contextualizes the relationship between the Dutch and their Indian 
allies/trading partners—the Mohawk/Iroquois, Mahican, Munsee, and Susquehannock 
peoples—in New Netherland. First, it describes the Dutch impetus for colonization of the 
Atlantic world and the motives that brought them to New Netherland/eastern 
Iroquoia/northern Lenapehoking/Mahican country. Then, it introduces the locations, 
broader culture, economic relationships, and political affairs of pre-Contact Indian groups 
in what became New Netherland. With this information, it attempts to shed light on Indians’ 
reasons for dealing with the Dutch as they did in the various regions of contact across the 
colony. Additionally, the chapter traces the development of Anglo-Dutch competition for 
land in the Northeast, which culminated in the Dutch strategy of permanent settlement and 
formal purchases of land from Indians to secure their North American claims. It is 
imperative to understand the differences between Dutch and English imperial logic, 
conceptions of land ownership, and colonization circumstances that resulted in early Dutch 
acknowledgement of Native sovereignty. Finally, the Dutch West India Company’s decision 
to commence permanent settlement and the meaning of its charter are analyzed in detail to 
allow for the proper interpretation of the land transfers that took place. 
Beavers and Axes: Early Dutch Presence in New Netherland, 1609-1629 
The story of the Dutch in New Netherland begins in 1609, with Henry Hudson’s 
preliminary exploration of his namesake river under the auspices of Dutch East India 
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Company.
98
 On this journey, he had a range of encounters with indigenous peoples, some 
friendly and others hostile.
99
 What was very clear by the time he started toward home was 
that there was a sizable population of natives all along the river willing to trade with 
newcomers for their practical wares—knives, axes, adzes, awls, copper kettles, mirrors, glass 
beads, guns, etc.—and that they had very desirable goods to offer in return—animal skins, 
most notably, though not exclusively, beaver pelts.
100
 This early voyage kindled Dutch interest 
in the area. 
 In creating an Atlantic empire, the young Dutch Republic was primarily interested in 
economic gain and in besting the Spanish crown, its religious and economic oppressor until 
approximately 1572, through piracy.
101
 Like the English, the new nation found private 
enterprise in the form of joint-stock companies the most convenient way to fund colonial 
enterprises. The Dutch had been operating in this way prior to the beginning of their activities 
in the Mid-Atlantic, having founded the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
102
 in 1602 to 
eliminate competition for the spice trade between private Dutch interests in Asia.
103
 They 
established “a regular…presence in the Hudson River valley after 1613.”104 In those earliest 
years of Dutch-Indian contact, multiple private interests competed for a monopoly over what 
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they termed the “Indian trade,” which the States General105 would grant to the strongest 
company.
106
  
The WIC was established in 1621 by the State of Holland, “the commercially and 
politically dominant province” within the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Jaap Jacobs 
explains that the WIC “was subdivided into five chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland, Maze, 
Noorderkwartier, and Stad en Lande.” Each chamber comprised a group of directors, who 
were elected for six-year terms from among those shareholders who had invested at least 
6,000 guilders. The Heren XIX/Lords Nineteen, a kind of company legislature in which 
each chamber (and the States General) was represented by a quantity of votes according to 
size and influence, was “its central administration, which was in charge of general policy.” 
The Amsterdam chamber managed the affairs of New Netherland, because “most of the 
voyages to [the region] had been organized by Amsterdam merchants.”107  
Though the idea of the WIC had been in the works since 1606, it had been delayed by 
the Twelve Year Truce with the Spanish from 1609 to 1621. The approach of the Truce’s 
expiration brought the dormant plan for the company back to the table. It was modeled after 
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the VOC and was to “control all Dutch activities in West Africa and the Americas.” As Mark 
Meuwese explains, the WIC’s goals were to  
extend the soon to be renewed war against Spain to the Atlantic. It was assumed that this 
would relieve military pressure from the Republic as Spain would be forced to invest 
heavily in the defense of its Atlantic possessions [which were the source of much of its 
wealth in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries]. Second, the expected profits 
from WIC shipping and trade would bring in much needed revenue for the Dutch state 
so that it could better finance its war against Spain.
108
  
 
With this “noble” conception, it is no surprise that the WIC emerged as the victor in the 
contest for exclusive rights to the fur trade in New Netherland at its birth in 1621. That year, 
the States General issued it a charter guaranteeing it a twenty-four year monopoly “on trade, 
shipping, and colonization in a region that included West Africa south of the Tropic of 
Cancer, the Americas, all islands in the Atlantic, [and]…all islands in the Pacific east of New 
Guinea.”109 In New Netherland, however, due chiefly to difficulties raising capital, the 
monopoly did not become a fact until 1623, when “private merchants brought back their last 
ships and their personnel from New Netherland or transferred them to the WIC.”110 
 As the WIC’s seventeenth-century interests in fur, African slaves, salt, and other 
trades show, the Dutch were most interested in commerce abroad—to fuel their economy, 
support their young nation, and fund their military efforts against Spain. Early Dutch 
colonization of the Mid-Atlantic region is expressive of this inclination: “Settlement,” Patricia 
Seed declares, “occupied a distinctly minor place in [their] efforts in the New World.”111 
Accordingly, the first Dutch footholds in the region were seasonal, semi-permanent trading 
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posts, rather than the permanent agricultural settlements of their English neighbors in 
southern New England.
112
 In 1614, with permission from the Mahican Indians,
113
 Fort Nassau, 
a shoddy fortified trading post, was built by the pre-WIC Van Tweehuysen Company
114
 on 
Castle Island in the Hudson River to facilitate trade with Mahicans and Mohawks. Though 
it is considered the first permanent Dutch settlement in North America, Fort Nassau was 
little more than a trading post with year-round attendants. The fort was abandoned in 1617 
due to frequent flooding and was swiftly reclaimed by nature.
115
  
Interest in “planting” a true colony of agricultural settlements was virtually non-
existent in the early years of the WIC as well. Though there was what Jacobs has termed a 
“colonization faction” within the Amsterdam chamber, it was outweighed by “the trade 
faction,” which thought “that the investment needed to establish an agricultural colony would 
be far too great.” The preference for “a small colony sufficient to protect the trading interests” 
underlay early WIC policy.
116
 The low rates of Dutch emigration did not counteract this 
disinclination. Unlike the English, who were experiencing a depressed market with high 
levels of unemployment and poverty, Netherlanders were entering the Dutch Golden Age 
in the early seventeenth century. When the WIC did become more invested in “true” 
colonization later, the low numbers of Dutch settlers contributed to the creation of 
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communities of relatively wide ethnic diversity, as Sephardic Jews, Walloons, French 
Hugenots, Englishmen, Scotchmen, and others fled from religious persecution and financial 
death in their homelands.
117
 
 In 1624, the WIC established a permanent fort/trading post, called Fort Orange, at 
the upper end of the Hudson River, “leasing” the land from Indians for the duration of 
official Bastiaen Jansen Crol’s stay in the area.118 The settlement of Beverwijck (“Beaver-
District”), established in 1652 and renamed Albany after the English takeover of the colony, 
developed around it with permanent Dutch settlement later on.
119
 In 1626, the WIC 
purchased Manhattan Island from its indigenous residents and built Fort Amsterdam there, 
which served as a defensive structure, a permanent trading post, and the capital of New 
Netherland.
120
 The settlement of New Amsterdam (later, New York) sprouted up around it 
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and was “incorporated” in 1653 with the establishment of a court.121 Fort Orange and Fort 
Amsterdam were early manifestations of a change in Dutch strategy and intentions in New 
Netherland from a sporadic, mercantile presence to the continuing, occupationally 
diversified one of settlement: in 1624, the year of the former’s establishment, the WIC sent 
its first boatload of prospective settlers to the colony.
122
 
Brothers of the Swanneken
123
: Indian Peoples of the Seventeenth-Century Hudson and 
Upper Delaware Valleys 
The Dutch mainly associated with four peoples in New Netherland. In the upper 
Hudson Valley, they dealt with the Mohawks and the Mahicans. The Mohawks were the 
powerful easternmost nation of the Iroquois League of Five Nations, which included, from 
east to west, the Iroquoian language-speaking Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and 
Seneca peoples. The Mohawks lived along the Mohawk River and on the upper reaches of 
the Hudson River.
124
 The Mahicans lived to the southeast of the Mohawks, on the upper half 
of the Hudson River, and spoke Mahican, an Algonquian language.
125
 In the lower Hudson 
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Valley, on western Long Island, and in the upper Delaware Valley, the Dutch dealt with 
various distinct Munsee bands who were not organized into an overarching polity, as the 
Iroquois were. These small groups included the Manhattans, Hackensacks, Canarsees, 
Raritans, Esopus, and others. These peoples spoke the Munsee dialect of the Delaware 
language, which is also an Algonquian language.
126
 In this southern area, the Dutch also 
encountered the powerful Susquehannocks, who lived inland from the upper Delaware 
River, on the Susquehanna River, and who were Iroquoian-language speakers.
127
 Each of 
these groups had its own intentions with regard to the newcomers that were inspired by 
political/military and economic needs. 
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In general, these peoples sought trade—access to European goods considered 
valuable for their rarity and convenience in daily life—and political alliances with the Dutch 
to strengthen their relative positions in the area. Writing on the “elusive intimacy” that 
characterized Dutch-indigenous relations in general, Susanah Shaw Romney explains that 
“Despite the questionable behavior and odd ways of these outsiders, Mohawks, Mahicans, 
Munsees, and Algonquian Long Islanders made them welcome, often choosing to tolerate 
their presence…in their own attempts to solidify trading partnerships.”128 The 
Susquehannocks are a case in point. Mark Meuwese writes: 
The WIC’s neglect of the South [Delaware] River region was a great disappointment 
for the Susquehannocks…Since [they] eagerly wanted access to European trade 
goods, they frequently clashed with the numerous [Munsee-] or Unami-speaking 
Algonquian communities who controlled the South River Valley. In 1626, a 
Susquehannock delegation…even visited the newly established WIC headquarters at 
Manhattan to establish a trade alliance.
129
 
 
Due to “the refusal of the WIC to invest in a permanent presence” in the area, the 
Susquehannocks ended up allying with the Swedes, who had established a colony on the ill-
guarded Dutch-claim border in 1638.
130
 Shortly after the Dutch conquest of New Sweden in 
1655, the Susquehannocks and their Munsee allies launched a surprise attack on New 
Amsterdam, initiating the short Peach War. Meuwese—along with Cynthia J. Van Zandt and 
others—thinks that “the attack was orchestrated…to prevent their Swedish allies from being 
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defeated.”131 Though Meuwese is right to say that this was in part due to Susquehannock 
distrust of the Dutch, who were allied with their Iroquois enemies, the fact that the under-
provisioned Swedes, whose supply ships did not even make an annual appearance in the 
Delaware Bay,
132
 traded with them more regularly may have been a factor in their decision to 
retaliate.  
In a new world of European technology, groups who lacked a European trading 
partner were potentially vulnerable to attack by better-equipped peoples. Juxtaposing the 
Franco-Huron-Montagnais-Algonquin alliance with the Dutch-Iroquois one, historian Colin 
G. Calloway explains that, though “skilled archers…could fire arrows accurately and in rapid 
succession,” “guns [nevertheless] brought supremacy over unarmed neighbors, and a tribe 
needed guns to survive.”133 In addition, such groups were at risk of losing economic ground, 
since they were more disconnected from what had become valued commodities in Indian 
trade networks and might also have less bargaining power with inland peoples for that reason. 
Before the 1610s, for example, the Iroquois themselves received small quantities of 
European goods indirectly through Indian peoples connected to the French. These goods, 
moreover, “were…already reworked by Indian craftspeople when they arrived in the Five 
                                                 
131
 Meuwese, Brothers, 280-281; and Cynthia J. Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of 
Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 181-185.  
132
 To maintain an alliance with the Susquehannocks, the Swedes were forced to purchase trade goods from the 
English to barter for Susquehannock furs and protection. See Meuwese, Brothers, 279-280; and Van Zandt, 
182. 
133
 Colin G. Calloway, First Peoples: A Documentary Survey of American Indian History, 4th ed., 2012, 
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 96-97. Calloway notes that “Many ethnohistorians question the degree 
to which Indian people became immediately dependent on European firearms [due to their unreliability when 
compared to a trained archer’s skill] and are reassessing the long-held belief that Iroquois warfare in [the 
seventeenth century] became driven by the pelts-for-guns trade. The Iroquois continued to wage wars for 
traditional reasons—to secure honor, revenge, and captives—even as they fought in a world of new economic 
threats and opportunities.” Loc cit.  
 51 
 
Nations,” for better or worse. The Iroquois also held less wealth in wampum at that time, 
since the French did not have access to it. The “semiregular Dutch presence on the upper 
Hudson,” Iroquois scholar Daniel K. Richter notes, “made European goods vastly more 
plentiful…[and] more items now arrived [in Iroquoia] intact.”134 
Trade also brought social influence and cohesion, both within groups and outside 
them, because it provided necessary new materials for ritualistic gift-exchanges. Gift-giving 
was a manifestation of reciprocity, a fundamental tenet of Native societies. Writing on 
Amerindian diplomacy in the colonial Hudson Valley, Tom Arne Midtrød asserts that 
“Reciprocal [gift] exchanges permeated all levels of Native society”— marriages, births, 
burials, religious feasts, and sometimes even ordinary meals.
135
 These exchanges were not 
simply about egalitarianism or kindness; they represented communal responsibility, which 
brought people together and ensured the survival of their community. As Midtrød explains,  
Refusing to give or share was a fundamentally antisocial act, tantamount to denying 
the existence or significance of social ties. Spurning proffered gifts…[was a denial] of 
reciprocal obligations, a threatening gesture in a social order built…on mutual 
obligations. The obligation to give and the obligation to reciprocate ensured that the 
flow of exchange never ceased, tying societies together.
136
 
 
In a society that relied on constant exchange to maintain harmony and cohesion, an increase 
in trade meant that there were more opportunities to build and strengthen relationships. 
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Within a group, a sachem
137
 could be more generous with his people, distributing 
more goods to them if trade was fruitful. This increased his political influence, “perhaps as 
a way of repaying [his] compatriots for [his] leadership positions, or as a way of exercising 
control by putting their people under obligation in return for chiefly generosity.” Midtrød 
argues that this practice of giving and redistributing goods was, in fact, a requirement of the 
sachemship, and one that was “virtually universal in Native America.”138 Outside a group, 
European goods could be given as tactful “tokens of peace to potential enemies.”139 Indeed, 
“diplomatic gifts” were a well-entrenched part of “the system of giving that existed at all levels 
of Native society and culture,” without which harmonious foreign relations could not exist.140 
Analyzing the fur trade between English colonists and Indians in the Connecticut Valley, 
Peter S. Thomas argues that “trade goods, useful in their own right, were also means to an 
end; and a multiplicity of transactions surrounding distribution of such items provided 
avenues for intro- and inter-societal integration. From a transactional viewpoint, [they] 
functioned at multiple levels among segmentary tribes.”141 Matthew Dennis agrees, writing 
that “for…the Iroquois and other Indians…trade was not the motivation for alliance so much 
as its by-product; exchange functioned symbolically as well as materially to cement alliances 
between friends and kinspeople.”142 
Trade with the newcomers also provided better access to wampum, which was a 
requisite for enacting diplomacy and holding political meetings between nations, in addition 
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to having spiritual significance.
143
 Wampum given after making a statement was akin to 
formally giving one’s word, or perhaps signing a document. Midtrød explains that “Wampum 
served as accreditation for messengers, a pledge of fidelity at treaties and agreements, and as 
a record or mnemonic device.” It could also be used for a host of other purposes, including 
as ransom for captives, compensation for a murder, tribute by subordinate groups, bribes, 
and wagers.
144
 Writing about Iroquois council meetings, Daniel K. Richter aptly describes the 
Indian logic underlying wampum’s function: “words alone were merely words...‘true’ words 
were always accompanied by presents of symbolically charged or economically valuable 
items…[and] the gift and the word…[were] inseparable.”145 In time, wampum also came to be 
valued and used as money by Europeans in New England and New Netherland, since they 
saw what it meant to indigenous peoples. Cantwell and Wall note that “the Dutch and other 
Europeans in the northeast[,] who found themselves short of coins[,]…used the shell beads 
to pay rents and fines, buy bread and other foodstuffs, and put in church collection plates.”146 
According to Lois Scozzari, the shells from which wampum was made are found 
chiefly off Long Island Sound and no further north than Cape Cod. Notwithstanding this, 
peoples much further north and inland, like the Mahicans and the Iroquois and their 
tributaries in the Connecticut Valley, used wampum extensively.
147
 Scozzari notes that the 
Dutch arrival in the area initiated the flow of large quantities of the valued shell beads to 
inland New York. This was part of what has been called the triangle trade: the Dutch traded 
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European goods to the coastal southern New England Pequots and other groups on the 
northern shore of Long Island for wampum. Sewant
148
 and European goods were then traded 
to the Iroquois and Mahicans to the northwest for furs, which were in turn sent back to the 
Netherlands for more trade goods.
149
  
The Dutch desire for wampum “in very large quantities and in standardized shapes 
for tribute or trade” altered the rhythms of Native life in the zone of wampum production. 
Munsee peoples of Long Island and nearby coastal regions “began making [wampum] 
according to Dutch specifications and with [the] European metal awls” that they had 
introduced, which were more efficient. Coastal Munsee life in southern New Netherland 
became organized around wampum manufacture for the Dutch trade. European interest and 
wampum’s new plenitude due to the new technology also changed its own role within Indian 
cultures. Previously rare since they were very laborious to manufacture, the beads gained 
more significance in “Native economic, social, and spiritual life.”150 
From the Mohawks’ and Mahicans’ perspective, the Dutch provided a direct link to 
the chief region of wampum manufacture. Faren R. Siminoff maintains that the initial trade 
of European good for Indian furs, in fact, “met with [only] moderate success” and that “prior 
to 1622, the annual fur shipments to Holland never rose above 1500 pelts.” This had put 
the New Netherland colony and the Dutch fur trade “on the verge of financial collapse.” 
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After the Dutch were introduced to “the intricacies and use of wampum,” however, trade 
increased. Unbelievably, annual shipments rose to 10000 pelts before 1630.
151
  
The Mohawks’ desire to be the sole benefiters from this connection, and from the 
Dutch trade in general, led the Iroquois to attempt to control the flow of furs from the 
northern interior by waging war on their competitors. Access to Dutch trade and the most 
valuable commodities that it provided the Iroquois—guns and wampum—led them to wage 
war on the Mahicans in the 1620s. The war ended in 1628, when the Mohawks finally 
“[drove the Mahicans]…back to the east side of the [Hudson] River…gaining control of the 
area around Fort Orange.”152 Bruce G. Trigger provides the Mohawk perspective on the 
conflict, writing that, 
There was always the danger that if hostilities should break out, the Mohawk would 
once again find themselves cut off from European goods. Under these circumstances, 
the Mohawk appear to have decided that their best strategy would be to drive the 
Mahicans from the Hudson Valley and, by taking control of the river, to compel the 
Dutch trades, who were few in number, to make an alliance with them on their own 
terms. In this way the Mohawk could assure that trade with the Dutch would not be 
interrupted and also prevent [them] from making alliances with potential enemies to 
the north.
153
 
 
The desire to control trade with the Dutch led the Iroquois to do the same thing with the 
Hurons in 1649. They defeated both groups and successfully “dispersed and destroyed [the] 
confederacy” of the once-prosperous Hurons.154 Further south, historian Amy C. Schutt 
writes that “Competition related to the rise of the fur trade sparked conflict between conflict 
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between Delaware Valley…[Munsees] and Susquehannocks in the seventeenth 
century…[though] this hostility does not appear to have been of long duration.”155 
In addition to trade and its numerous social benefits, indigenous nations sought 
political alliances with European ones in order to strengthen their position in the intricate 
web of rival alliances that had lined the Northeast for a long time on European arrival. Jason 
R. Sellers states that, “Native Americans sought to integrate the newcomers into their existing 
network of social relations and a physical landscape that manifested those relations.”156 This 
was attempted through trade itself and the integration of the newcomers into their societies 
as fictive kin, another recurring theme in Native societies.  
“Trade,” Richter asserts, “was a function of diplomacy.”157 It acted as a cementer of 
political alliances because it was essentially a gift-exchange, carrying the expectation and 
obligations of reciprocity to both receivers in the transaction. When economic trade 
occurred between members of two different nations, Indian or European, a ritual gift-
exchange was also occurring that bound not only those individuals but their respective 
nations together in allegiance. But these were not one-off affairs: relations had to be 
maintained and renewed. Studying the Munsee and Unami Delaware Indians, historian Amy 
C. Schutt emphasizes that “trade in goods involved the maintenance of relationships between 
peoples and included expectations of [pure] gift giving…Trade joined diplomacy to reinforce 
connections between Algonquians and Europeans.”158  
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Europeans did not always understand the implications of trade. Not only did they 
“[distinguish] between commercial and diplomatic exchanges,” two things that did not exist 
in isolation in Indian societies, but in the case of the Dutch, there was a strong desire for no-
strings-attached, heavily profit-driven trade.
159
 But in Indian cultures, exchange of goods 
committed trading partners and peoples to supporting one another in matters beyond 
business. It was, Paul Otto declares, “a step toward building intertribal alliances,” and 
indigenous peoples, Schutt agrees, “created both loose and formal alliances with their regular 
trading partners.”160 In the end, the Dutch in northern New Netherland found themselves 
forced to enter into a full-fledged political alliance with the Iroquois to keep them as clients 
and friendly neighbors.
161
 Indeed, they did not have any other option. Studying Euro-Indian 
relations across the eastern seaboard, Cynthia J. Van Zandt argues: 
Intercultural alliances in seventeenth-century North America were fundamentally 
based on an Indian logic rather than a European one. Europeans often struggled 
against that framework; they usually misunderstood aspects of it, but they were forced 
time and…again to follow its dictates at least partially, and they did.162 
 
Additionally, alliances with Indian nations were not quite the same as unions with 
European ones. Though they required the “mutual [military] aid and protection” customary 
in European political alliances, they also surpassed those standards: Indian polities expected 
their allies to act as mediators in their political conflicts with other nations and to provide 
materially for them in times of need, expecting little in return until circumstances had 
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improved. Alliances, Matthew Dennis stresses, demanded “spiritual and emotional as well 
as material support.”163  
The Dutch-Iroquois alliance was no different, and was “based on reciprocity, mutual 
obligation, and kinship, which the Five Nations demanded.”164 The Iroquois called on the 
Dutch to fulfil their duties in these capacities. Below are some demands that they made at a 
conference in 1659: 
8 They say and request that the smith, when they have no money, shall nevertheless 
repair their goods, regardless of whether they have much or little seawan. [They] Give 
thereupon one beaver and a string of seawan… 
10 They say, when we come from the country, even if the guns are repaired, we have 
no powder. You must therefore give us some powder and if the enemy should come, 
you will not care to help us…let us have only 50 or 60 men for assistance. [They] 
Give thereupon two beavers. 
11 He says that he has two sons taken prisoner by the French…They trust that they 
will yet be released and request that the Dutch will bring them back and that they 
would do the same for us. Give thereupon two beavers… 
13 They…request that we shall go there with 30 men and horses to cut and draw 
wood for their castles to repair them…Give thereupon a beaver coat and one beaver. 
15 They say finally, you need not give us anything in return. They thereupon give 
one beaver.
165
 
 
This excerpt shows the extent of commitment that political allies were expected to show one 
another. Material assistance was expected from an ally as a matter of course, as was mediation 
in conflicts—not just in wartime, but to recover hostages and other adjustments in its wake. A 
generous ritual gift accompanied each request in a show of reciprocity and diplomatic 
affection. These presents were gathered and pooled by the whole community in advance of 
diplomatic meetings and, as such, represented not only the word of a sachem but “the 
                                                 
163
 Dennis, 169-170; and Midtrød, Memory, 65.  
164
 Dennis, 163. 
165
 Conferences with the Mohawks at Fort Orange and Kaghnuwage, 6, 8, 16, and 24 September 1659, in Early 
American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, vol. VII, New York and New Jersey Treaties, 
1609-1682, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), 190-191. 
 59 
 
consent of the kin and followers who had banded together to produce them.”166 But the most 
striking remark is the last one: the Mohawks did not expect gifts in return. Though this may 
have meant that they did not expect diplomatic gifts in return for the ones that they had just 
given the Dutch, more likely it meant that they did not expect a superfluity of gifts. Indians 
expected reciprocity and not an unequal relationship of free favors. They were requesting 
only what they would themselves do for the Dutch at a moment’s notice. It should be clarified 
that despite trade’s unique place in Indian societies pricing did indeed concern Indians, just 
not for economic reasons. Steep prices were the mark of a poor ally, of a relationship that 
was ungenerous because it was not balanced.
167
 
Calling Europeans “brothers” and treating them as kin was another means of forging 
alliances with them, and one that “appears to have been almost universal in Native America,” 
according to Tom Arne Midtrød.
168
 As Andrew Lipman explains, the use of kinship terms in 
referring to the newcomers “was no mere sentimental affectation but a firm agreement of 
mutual accountability.”169 It attempted to assimilate them into a preexisting network of 
reciprocal support and shared obligation that began with the base unit of Native society, the 
family, and extended from subgroups/villages within a nation to allied nations.
170
 Midtrød 
declares that “Making outsiders kin was a primary way of making them friends and allies. 
Once related by marriage and kinship, people belonging to different groups were bound by 
                                                 
166
 Richter, 47 and 48. 
167
 Dennis, 175. 
168
 Midtrød, Memory, 29 
169
 Lipman, Saltwater, 36. Also Midtrød, Memory, 29-31; and Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch Village on 
the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 164. 
170
 Midtrød, Memory, 24, 29-31, 39, 62-64, and 65-67; Lipman, Saltwater, 36; Van Zandt, 13 and 69-71; Dennis, 
132 and 175; and Schutt, 57. 
 60 
 
reciprocal obligation to one another.”171 To establish a partnership, the Powhatans of the 
Chesapeake attempted to integrate the Jamestown colonists as fictive kin, which would ideally 
lead to the creation of literal kin, as it did with the marriage of Pocahontas and John Rolfe.
172
 
The formation of fictive kinship ties was also used in an attempt to integrate whole peoples 
politically, as additions to confederacies. As Matthew Dennis states, “the Five Nations traded 
in order to acquire the Netherlanders as kinsmen and maintain peace and prosperity in their 
new world,” but they also sought “to naturalize outsiders in their greater Longhouse.”173 The 
Iroquoian desire to absorb other peoples has imperialistic trappings, but it was also a strategy 
for preserving peace. There could be no intertribal conflict between peoples who had 
become one politically, and, to some extent, culturally.
174
 
Each indigenous people had enemies against which a political alliance was welcome. 
The Iroquois were enemies of the Mahicans, Susquehannocks, and other groups in the lower 
Hudson and upper Delaware Valleys, in addition to the Hurons, Eries, Neutrals, Wendats, 
and other Algonquian Great Lakes peoples to the west. Just as the Huron allied with the 
French for support against the Iroquois, Sellers notes that “The Iroquois…and the Mohawks 
in particular, seem to have constituted the primary threat against which Hudson Valley 
Indians posed themselves and Europeans as allies.”175 The powerful Iroquois themselves 
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looked on the Dutch as a potential “sixth nation,” over which they could extend the rafters 
of the metaphorical longhouse to create an even more powerful military alliance of nations.
176
  
Later, these same early motivations—trade and the related formation of political 
alliances—would also encourage Native peoples to sell land to the Dutch.177 New European 
settlements nearby were convenient for Native peoples in the early Contact period. They 
provided access to trade goods, a market for their own goods, and were also seen as helpful 
in effecting the eventual integration of Europeans as kin and allies in Indian networks. For 
example, the Dutch bought a tract of land on the Connecticut River from the Pequots in 
1633 and built Fort Good Hope on it to protect their southern New England claims from 
the English. Mark Meuwese rightly notes that “The Pequots did not consider the small 
number of Dutch traders and soldiers a threat, but rather a guarantee of a constant flow of 
trade goods.”178 For the Iroquois, on the other hand, “the establishment of new European 
settlements…conveniently situated and bound into a larger Iroquois longhouse by ties of 
friendship, reciprocity, and even kinship was consistent with the vision and historical 
experience of the Five Nations.”179  
Land could also be used more directly in the name of diplomacy: Siminoff notes that 
eastern Long Island Natives traditionally exchanged or used land “to cement political ties 
and concurrent obligations…to fashion…lasting and satisfactory client/protectorate 
relationship[s.]” Their deed to the English in 1640 was nothing more than another instance 
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of this type of land use, creating mutual obligation and bringing the English physically close 
to them for a tighter union.
180
 Studying the effects of land sales on Wampanoag sachemships 
in New England, David Silverman agrees, maintaining that, “acquiring manufactured goods 
in exchange for land simultaneously strengthened [sachems’] relations with the English, while 
displaying and circulating the goods allowed them to consolidate and extend influence at 
home.”181 Finally, land itself could be traded to continue to effect the trade that was the 
lifeblood of alliances and to acquire European goods themselves. For the Munsees of 
southern New Netherland, whose beaver populations were quickly exhausted by the fur 
trade, land replaced the beaver as the primary article of trade, with wampum and food being 
secondary trade items.
182
 Trading land provided the European goods they had come to like 
and depend on, and also helped retain the Dutch as allies, since it gave Munsees something 
of value that they could reciprocate with. 
The problems would begin to arise when the short-term advantages of alienation of 
land began to have direct, long-term consequences. A little trading post or even a small village 
might not be a hindrance nearby, but that was very different from large-scale settlement or a 
swath of European farms coming increasingly closer to Indian towns, corn fields, and hunting 
grounds. The kind of proximity that the latter entailed was a breeding ground for neighborly 
strife, apart from the fact that Indians may not have expected or ever been interested in that 
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kind of European land use and presence when they sold land to them. The Esopus Munsee 
scenario is a case in point. The Esopus sold land to the Dutch in the hopes of gaining their 
trade. They never imagined that the Dutch would make full use of the land in the form of 
permanent agricultural settlements. When they finally realized it, they attacked the newer 
agricultural settlements in protest, setting off the string of Esopus Wars, which they ultimately 
lost. Holly Anne Rine briefly summaries the conflict: 
The Esopus Indians…sold land…to the Dutch, which opened the way for the initial 
arrival of Dutch settlers in their neighborhood in 1652. Esopus resistance to Dutch 
agricultural expansion later in the decade indicates that the [they] were interested in 
Dutch trade rather than Dutch agriculture. A Dutch presence in the area provided 
them with easier access to Dutch trade on the Hudson, reducing the interference 
from Mohawks near Fort Orange and other Munsees at New Amsterdam as well as 
bringing the Dutch into established Esopus trade networks. A Dutch trading post did 
not hinder Esopus land use for fishing, hunting, and agriculture, but could even 
strengthen their economic and diplomatic standing in relation to their neighbors. By 
1652, however, the WIC intended to use the land for farming and establishing a 
settlement colony, not trade.
183
 
 
Like other cross-cultural misunderstandings, misalignment in “expectant land-use practices” 
between the Dutch and Indian created conflict, but that does not mean that efforts to bridge 
these lacunae were not made. The two groups accommodated one another to the extent that 
the logic behind their desires and actions was mutually intelligible, and, of course, to the 
extent that they had something to gain from the bond. The deeds to be discussed in the next 
chapter are a clear instance of this mutual effort, irrespective of how things turned out for 
Northeastern indigenous peoples in the end. 
English Territoriality and the Beginnings of Permanent Dutch Settlement  
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As noted earlier, the WIC was not much interested in permanent agricultural 
settlement in New Netherland. In spite of their trade orientation, the Dutch still claimed 
New Netherland as a colony, and the WIC had indeed received a charter from the States 
General. This charter allowed the WIC to use and possess unoccupied land directly or such 
land as could be purchased from the area’s indigenous inhabitants by granting it the authority 
“to make contracts, leagues and alliances with the princes and natives of the countries therein 
comprised.”184 The WIC seems to have followed these directions wherever they established 
a settlement, as the land purchases and the lack of conflict with Native peoples in this early 
period shows.
185
 Much of what the Dutch claimed as New Netherland against the English and 
French powers on either side of them, however, was only thinly settled by the Dutch, and 
most of it was Indian land under exaggerated, wishful claim boundaries. As Cantwell and 
Wall explain, “All the Dutch settlements were surrounded by Indian country—Beverwijck 
and Rensselaerswijck by Mahican settlements, with Mohawk settlements just to the west; New 
Amsterdam by Munsee groups; and New Amstel [est. 1655 after the Dutch conquest of New 
Sweden] by different Algonquian and Iroquoian groups.”186 Not surprisingly, the weak 
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foothold of the Dutch quickly caught the attention of the English to the east in southern New 
England, who began to contest Dutch claims. 
The English were drawn to the eastern fringe of the Dutch colonial claim. This area 
comprised the fertile Connecticut Valley of western Massachusetts and Connecticut. The 
Dutch claim to this land was nominal at best, unsubstantiated by Dutch settlement as it was.
187
 
The land was and is some of the most fertile in New England and great for subsistence family 
farming, which was the goal of early-seventeenth-century Puritan communities. It was also 
right in the path of the English progression westward and up the river from present-day 
Connecticut as land became expensive and scarce in coastal New England.
188
 They were also 
drawn to Long Island, which they quickly colonized and effectively claimed the eastern 
portion of after winning the Pequot War in 1638.
189
 The victory over the Pequots, Faren R. 
Siminoff explains, gave the English “a sense of legal entitlement [by conquest in war] to all 
of Connecticut and to the islands in the Long Island sound, home to many former Pequot 
tributaries.”190 Long Island was attractive for its abundance of land, but it was equally 
important as a source of wampum. The Dutch feared English Plymouth Colony’s usurpation 
of the area, and rightfully so, since whoever controlled the supply wampum effectively 
controlled trade in the Northeast. “Access to clam banks” for wampum production, Andrew 
Lipman concludes, was a “major factor in regional politics.”191  
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The English strategy for usurping Dutch-claimed land was to invalidate their claims 
on theoretical grounds and then to confidently encroach. The English tried to claim the land 
by “peopling and planting” it and through other “rituals, ceremonies, and symbolic acts of 
possession.”192 The most important rationale, however, was the idea of vacuum domicilium, 
which attempted to invalidate first Indian, and later Dutch, title to the land.
193
 Under this 
theory, the English alleged a right to the land because it was uninhabited and thus unclaimed 
land. English principles of land use were the logic underwriting this theory. Even though 
Indian peoples had clear territorial boundaries, erected organized villages, kept land set aside 
for tillage, and kept swaths of groomed forest as game preserves, the lack of fenced plots and 
the prevalence of so-called forest “wilderness” gave it the appearance of being “unimproved” 
by English standards. To them, settlement required “the erection…of permanent structures 
and fields for agriculture and residential living,” as well as the enclosure of the land with 
fences. It also required a population of reasonable size. As Faren R. Siminoff notes, though, 
“English settlers applied this litmus test…not only to indigenous peoples but to all 
groups…This explains…[their] disregard for Dutch claims to areas in southern New England 
and their grudging acknowledgement of…[their] claim to the western portion of Long Island 
and to Manhattan Island.”194 Sabine Klein agrees, writing that since “the Indians and the 
Dutch were interested only in trade and not the land…neither…had the right to the territory 
                                                 
192
 Seed, 3 and chap. 1; and Siminoff, 36.   
193
 Sabine Klein, “‘They Have Invaded the Whole River’: Boundary Negotiations in Anglo-Dutch Colonial 
Discourse,” Early American Studies 9:2 (spring, 2011): 343-344. 
194
 Siminoff, 36-38; and Seed, 32-33, chap. 1, 170-173, and 176-177. 
 67 
 
they claimed…Moreover, because they failed to use the land in a civilized manner, the Dutch 
presence, like the Indian presence, could be overlooked.”195 
Some of the English also asserted that only Christians could hold legal title to land. 
Indian peoples, whose animistic religions made them pagan infidels in Christian eyes, could 
not. This idea was bolstered by the English belief that Indian peoples were nomads and thus 
barbarians. In reality, Indian peoples in the northeastern woodlands lived in semi-permanent 
villages, moving every 20 or 30 years to allow the land to lie fallow and regain its fertility. The 
same practice was used to preserve the game population of hunting reserves. Nevertheless, 
the connection between non-Christians and barbarianism existed intact regardless of 
settlement patterns. Indigenous peoples purportedly living in a “state of nature” held only a 
natural right to their land (and only to as much as they could “properly” use), if any, and that 
right was inferior to that of the peoples that the Christian god had ordered to multiply and 
settle the earth, who needed more room for their glorious, divinely ordained expansion.
196
 
The Dutch defended their claims through opposing theories. “Discovery” of a region 
before other Christian nations and the use of it to conduct trade, Siminoff explains, “created 
a sufficient nexus for the assertion of a valid claim again all other Christian nations.”197 The 
most significant strategy to this thesis is their recognition of indigenous land rights, which led 
them to purchase land from indigenous peoples and claim it against the English by formally 
transferred legal title.
198
 The Dutch had more than blatant self-interest in mind when they 
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chose to strike out in this way. According to Meuwese, the Dutch may have felt a moral 
desire to adopt a fairer colonization strategy than that of the Spanish, which had become 
infamous in Europe. Though other imperial powers, including the English themselves, also 
had comparative ethics in mind, this may have been a more personal goal for the Dutch who 
had a bitterly intertwined history with the Spanish. They may have situated themselves and 
Amerindian peoples as common victims of Spanish oppression.
199
 
There is also the powerful reason of palpable Indian sovereignty itself. The Dutch 
were arguably faced with more powerful Indian nations than the English. The latter landed 
on the southern New England coast, which had been extensively depopulated by a smallpox 
epidemic just prior to their arrival. Though peoples like the Pequot and Wampanoag still 
held considerable influence in the area until it was broken in the Pequot (1637-38) and King 
Philip’s Wars (1675-76), respectively, population loss had weakened them substantially, 
which is what had led them to seek alliances with the English in the first place.
200
 Whatever 
their motives, the Dutch reasoned that Indians, as the land’s original inhabitants, were its 
legal owners, and initiated the practice of purchasing land from Indians through written 
deeds.
201
 
With this legal battle in play, the WIC incorporated permanent settlement into its 
agenda, seeing that their claims would be subject to violation if they did not establish a 
presence throughout New Netherland. It “reserve[d] to itself the island of the Manhattes,” 
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to parcel out to settlers at will, and it established the patroonship system of colonization 
through its publication of the Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions on June 7, 1629. This 
system allowed for the establishment of private patroonships by large WIC investors. These 
were intended to be feudal manors similar to Lord Baltimore’s Maryland Colony to the 
south. The patroonships would allow the Company to people New Netherland more evenly, 
protecting its claims, since patroons were held “to plant there a colony of 50 souls, upwards 
of 15 years old, within the space of four years… on pain, in case of wilful neglect, of being 
deprived of the privileges obtained.”202 
The colonization strategy also took some of the responsibility for governing settlers 
away from the Company, since the patroons had to “furnish [their colonies] with proper 
instructions in order that they may be ruled and governed conformably to the rule of [Dutch] 
government.” Better still, the patroons would very conveniently provide the additional 
financial backing for these costly colonies. The WIC would allow them to use their ships to 
transport settlers and goods, but they would have to pay for the full passage of the former. 
To transport the necessaries for planting a settlement, patroons would pay,  
five per cent cash of the[ir] cost…without including herein, however, cattle and 
agricultural implements, which the Company is to carry over free, if there is room in 
its ships, provided that the patroons, at their own expense, fit up places for the cattle 
and furnish everything necessary for their support. 
 
In return, patroons got to hold valuable lands in “perpetual fief of inheritance,” having 
“only” to pay a one-time property tax of 20 guilders. They were also permitted “to trade 
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their goods [and] products of that country, for all sorts of merchandise that may be had 
there,” though the avaricious WIC discouraged them from pursuing the most lucrative 
business, the fur trade. Patroons could trade for “anything” except 
beavers…and all sorts of peltry, which trade alone the Company reserves to itself. 
But permission for even this trade is granted [only] at places where the Company 
has no agent, on the condition that such traders must bring all the peltry they may 
be able to secure to the island of the Manhattes…[and] may pay to the Company 
one guilder for each merchantable beaver and otter skin; the cost, insurance and all 
other expenses to remain at the charge of the patroons or owners. 
 
This last provision proved very problematic since it denied everyone but the Company an 
opportunity for commercial success (beyond agriculture, of course, which paled in 
comparison to the fur trade). It was finally annulled with the released of the revised Charter 
of Freedoms and Exemptions in 1640, in which the WIC surrendered its monopoly and 
“became an administrative institution, fulfilling the role of government.”203 
 Though the patroonship system was short-lived, with most of the sub-colonies 
coming to naught,
204
 its most important contribution to Dutch-indigenous relations survived 
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it. In its charter, the WIC required prospective patroons settling beyond Manhattan Island 
to seek out the rightful owners of the lands they sought and “to satisfy the Indians of that 
place for [it].” This requirement was doubtless problematic; it acknowledged Indian title, but 
simultaneously situated Indian lands within unfounded Dutch colonial claim boundaries. 
This paradox creates an impression of the WIC as having placed sovereign Indian territory 
on the rank of a private citizen’s estate while the Company boldly assumed an overarching 
gubernatorial title to it. Rule VIII enhances this impression: it allowed the patroons to “use 
all lands, rivers and woods lying contiguous to them, until such time as they are taken 
possession of by this Company, other patroons, or private persons.” It seems to assume that 
seemingly unsold land around the WIC was theirs for subsequent development. Rule XXII 
similarly gave private persons the “rights of hunting, as well by water as by land, in common 
with others in public woods and rivers” outside of their colonies.205  
This interpretation assumes, however, that the Company did not buy that land in 
addition to the patroonship terrain. James Warren Springer, looking at legal aspects of 
Indians’ land ownership in colonial New England, in fact, maintains that “There is very little 
to suggest that the colonists regarded the charters as giving them full ownership rights over 
the land. Indeed, the importance of negotiating with the Indians for any lands that they 
claimed within the area of the patent was emphasized from the very beginning.” He explains 
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that English royal charters “neither recognized nor denied [Indian rights in the land],” saying 
that they perceived it as giving them “the right to exercise political authority over the territory 
and to demand submission from the Indians in exchange for protection,” a common 
exchange in the European monarchal world. The land itself either had to be “vacant” or 
settled “on invitation from the Indians.”206  
Though the line between ruling a people and owning their territory is a very fine one 
that eventually vanishes, Springer’s point about the English colonizers’ expressed need to 
negotiate for the land holds significant weight and can be applied to the Dutch scenario in 
early New Netherland. It does not seem logical that the WIC would have bothered to 
purchase any lands if their claims been exact equivalents of ownership/possession of title. In 
that vein, it does not make sense that they would purchase a patroonship plot and not the 
land around it, the unauthorized use of which would have created the trade-stagnating conflict 
that they wished to avoid. The States General’s 1666 Charter of the West India Company, 
like other European charters, seems to have been something akin to obtaining their 
government’s blessing to attempt profitable economic activity and settlement where possible, 
by dealing with indigenous inhabitants directly. It was also something to wave at European 
rivals with a similar culture and that held no weight before the reality of Native political 
sovereignty and military might.  
To that effect, the WIC’s charter specifically allowed for it “to promote the settlement 
of fertile and uninhabited districts” and “to make contracts, leagues and alliances with the 
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princes and natives of the countries therein comprised,” which the lawful transfer of land 
falls under.
207
 Though one could still question what “uninhabited” meant to the Dutch, we 
have seen that it did not mean non-Christian settlement, as it did to some of the English. 
With a careful reading of the document, it becomes clear that the WIC’s original charter 
acknowledged indigenous title and that the charter itself was not meant to hollow out or 
extirpate this title. Indeed, it could do no such thing given the reality of Indian dominance. 
The later 1629 Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions’ stipulation that Indians be paid for 
prospective patroonship land, however, struck new ground by explicitly recognizing Indian 
title in writing. Emerging amid English encroachment on Dutch claims, this conspicuous 
recognition of Indian sovereignty was the progenitor of the Indian deeds analyzed in this 
study and of the legal middle ground that developed around land sales.  
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CHAPTER III: DUTCH-INDIAN DEEDS, 1630-1664: A FLEXIBLE WORLD 
This chapter argues that the existing deeds documenting seventeenth-century sales of 
Indian land to the Dutch show evidence of a legal middle ground in their language, 
stipulations, indirect depictions of the ritualistic transfer event, and in the variety of 
agreements that is discernible when they are analyzed as a free-standing group of documents. 
The Dutch-Indian deeds portray the Dutch broadly recognizing Indian social and political 
customs and electing to abide by them to an extent, regardless of the particular balance of 
political/military power in each region of the colony. The decision to plant a colony in the 
Hudson Valley and western Long Island areas made flexibility paramount to everyday peace 
and beneficial military agreements for both parties. Dutch customs could not hold exclusive 
sway over how land sales were transacted in a multicultural new world. Instead the two 
parties, Indian and Dutch, had to meet halfway, combining cultural notions and legal 
practices into a new standard practice. The surviving land agreements contain qualities of 
both Dutch and Indian land tenures and are unique to the Dutch-Indian colonial frontier. 
This métissage
208
 of traditions is a common result of Euro-Indian and cross-cultural 
contact in general. Analyzing Anglo- and Dutch-indigenous diplomacy side-by-side, Cynthia 
J. Van Zandt writes:  
As people from different cultures worked to live with one another and…use one 
another for mutual advantage, the associations they formed took on a logic of their 
own. The reasons for intercultural agreements led European leaders to do things they 
would not otherwise have done, often with considerable internal dissent and 
anxiety…it [also] led Native Americans to…try to accommodate the European 
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newcomers’ persistent inability to fulfill their proper role as understood by their 
Indian partners.
209
 
 
The Dutch-Indian land deals exhibit precisely this mixture of mutual accommodation, 
without which alliances and collaboration would not have been possible. Each party tried to 
nudge the other toward doing what they thought was customary and proper in matters of 
land use, co-use, lease, and alienation. In order to discern the middle ground at work in the 
seventeenth-century Dutch-Indian land transactions, the individual land tenures of both 
cultures will be examined briefly, followed by the analysis of the transactions themselves.  
Buying the Land: Dutch Land Tenure and Transplantation to New Netherland 
In the Dutch world of credits, debits, and interdependence through agreements, land 
was an alienable commodity. It could be permanently owned, bought, and sold by 
individuals, and its ownership changed only through explicit sale to or bestowal on another. 
Land also “constituted part of an investment portfolio.”210 Writing on Dutch-Iroquois 
relations, Matthew Dennis explains that “New Netherlanders valued land and real property 
not for the status that it might convey [as their English neighbors did,] but for the commercial 
opportunities it might promote.”211 These included using the land for farming or ranching; 
erecting a tavern, shop, or other trade business on it; leasing it for income; selling it at a profit 
outright, and even using it “as collateral for credit.”212  
But Dutch land tenure also had a communal dimension: Cantwell and Wall note that 
“At home in the Netherlands, farmers for the most part still practiced the open-field system, 
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with herders tending livestock that grazed on common land in the warmer months but were 
sheltered in barns in the winter.” Individual plots were enclosed by dikes or trenches in the 
Netherlands and by wooden fences in New Netherland, where timber was plentiful. This was 
done to keep crops from being eaten or otherwise destroyed by the free-ranging livestock.
213
 
The system of land use was similar in New Netherland. Once a New Netherlander 
had been granted a lot in Beverwijck or at Manhattan they were required to fence it in and 
build on it “within a short time,” (specifically six weeks in Beverwijck) “on pain of being 
deprived of [it].”214 This rule had a precedent in the Fatherland, Hoorn being an example of 
a town with the same rule; however, it also had colonial antecedents. For one thing, the WIC 
granted land to encourage settlement, as has been noted, and it would not tolerate colonists 
hoarding land without settling or otherwise developing it. Secondly, as the two main centers 
of Dutch settlement budded, land was limited due to the large size of the typical Company 
grant, which was about 50 morgens (approximately 100 acres) in New Amsterdam, and the 
WIC’s finite holdings in each region: New Amsterdam was on an island and Beverwijck was 
hemmed in by the Hudson River and the Rensselaerswijck patroonship.
215
 Moreover, 
settlement beyond those bounds could not be attempted until the WIC had purchased more 
land from Indians. Janny Venema notes that the laws on building and fencing in a timely 
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manner were enforced because “other people desired to build and scarsely [sic] could find 
a spot on which a house could conveniently be built.”216 
If a Dutch colonist followed the rules and fenced their plot in a timely manner, 
Venema explains that, “The area within the fenced-in space [became] the private domain of 
the owner,” to do with as s/he pleased. “A fence,” she stresses, also “marked the public 
domain,” which was owned by either the Company or the patroon, depending on where one 
lived.
217
 As in the Netherlands, cattle wandered freely in the public domain, in keeping with 
the open-field tradition. Frequent conflicts with neighboring Indians, who did not fence their 
fields and accordingly had their crops eaten or spoiled by meandering hogs, attest to this. 
The Dutch had long formalized the process of land acquisition with written legal 
documentation before a district judge to help ensure that the participants in a transfer would 
not go back on their word and that there was dependable material for a lawsuit if they did. 
As Martha Dickinson Shattuck, a historian of New Netherlandish law, explains, Dutch 
society was organized by a legal system that “was based on written instruments which 
provided evidence for anything that might be called into dispute, or which made legal certain 
acts.” Beyond that, it was uniquely strict, even among European societies, in that “oral 
contracts were extremely rare” and normally required at least two witnesses “to be upheld in 
court.”218 “Formal written authorization” was a fundamental component of legality in Dutch 
society, and it held much more weight than oral contracts or physical acts.
219
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In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands operated under Roman-Dutch law, “a 
jurisprudence that combined the laws and ordinances of the Netherlands, the privileges of 
custom and usage, canon law,
220
 and Roman civil law.”221 This legal system had its origins in 
the Middle Ages, when the Netherlands were “a group of individual states, each governed by 
a count or a duke, who received his land from the [Holy Roman] emperor to whom he owed 
his fealty.” The system had respected the extensive local laws developed over many centuries 
through negotiation with a town’s lord, which “were jealously guarded by the people.” While 
such laws were practical for the towns in which they had originated, however, Shattuck notes 
that “their local nature was of little help in a growing urban society whose commerce 
extended across provinces and throughout Europe.” Consequently, jurists would often seek 
recourse to Roman law to decide complex cases.
222
  
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw “a series of centralizing ordinances” 
through which the House of Burgundy (and the Habsburgs who succeeded it in control of 
the Netherlands)
223
 “regularized the laws and…promoted Roman law as the common law224 of 
the Netherlands,” seeking to establish legal uniformity in the region. These ordinances 
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succeeded in codifying Roman law and “assimilated many of the provincial laws.” The 
transformation culminated in the “the Political Ordinance of April 1, 1580, issued by the 
States of Holland,” which “enacted thirty-seven articles” regarding “marriage, succession, 
sales, leases, mortgages, and registration and fees” and finally annulled contradictory 
provincial laws, which had created confusion and, allegedly, opportunities for fraud. 
According to Shattuck, “These laws and their subsequent revisions and ordinances, governed 
the Netherlands in 1621, when the States General chartered the [WIC] as a joint-stock 
trading company.”225  
New Netherland’s legal system was intended to be a near-replica of the Netherlands’ 
from the very beginning. The second set of instructions sent to Willem Verhulst, the second 
director general of the colony, on April 22, 1625, specifically commanded that “In the 
administration of justice, in matters concerning marriages, the settlement of estates, and 
contracts, the ordinances and customs of Holland and Zeeland and the common written law 
qualifying them shall be observed and obeyed.”226 In addition, the colony was bound by 
Amsterdam’s “municipal ordinances,” since it was the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC that 
was in charge of New Netherland.
227
 Being a place with its own unique circumstances, such 
as “the complex relationship with the Indians or the mundane but vexing problem of roaming 
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hogs,” New Netherland naturally needed additional laws of its own. These decrees could not 
contradict Dutch law in the Fatherland and the director general had to run prospective 
ordinances by the WIC’s Amsterdam chamber “for approval before they were enacted.” 
Shattuck notes that “in actual practice [orders] were enacted and then sent,” since 
communication was slow and the impromptu problems of colonial life needed immediate 
solutions.
228
 
Though its law was similar, New Netherland’s government diverged from that of its 
parent society. According to Shattuck, the difference was that New Netherland “had a strong 
central government dedicated to preserving the rights of the [WIC].” Since the colony was a 
private venture, the director and Council of New Netherland were appointed by the 
Company in the Netherlands with no electoral process, towns were not represented in the 
government, and “the Council alone determined the scope of the local courts,” with New 
Netherlanders having “no [right of] appeal…beyond the colonial council.”229 Back home in 
the Netherlands, the government was very decentralized, and “authority ran from the lower 
to the higher governing bodies,” with the States General handling only “subjects of war or 
peace…[and having] supreme control over overseas possessions.” Issues that the States 
General could not come to a decision on went back down the line to the provincial 
assemblies and then to the town governments until a solution was found.
230
  
In New Netherland, land was first purchased from Indian proprietors by the WIC, 
either in its own name or on behalf of patroons. The newly purchased land was then patented 
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off to colonists by the Director General and Council, or by their patroonship’s government, 
depending on the jurisdiction that they were settling in. Settlers could then buy and sell plots 
among themselves as they saw fit, transferring them via written deeds. Sometimes, the WIC 
would also issue a patent to the new owner of the vended plot. Janny Venema notes that in 
Beverwijck, “the process of buying and selling lots…started at once,” leading to many splits 
of the original lots into smaller subsections.
231
  
Once a Dutch person had made up their mind to sell a lot, “conditions of sale” were 
sometimes registered stipulating the condition of the property upon transferal and acceptable 
forms of payment. This was most common with properties that were being sold at auctions. 
These pre-sale documents were meant to shield all parties involved in a transaction from the 
sudden pitfalls of vague language. For example, on October 27, 1654, Abraham Staets put 
his house and lot up for bid at a public auction; his conditions were that 
the payment shall be made in whole, good beavers in three installments, the first 
installment being a just third part within the space of one month from the date of this, 
precisely, without any exceptions…within which time the aforesaid house and garden 
shall be able [to be] occupied by the buyer on the aforesaid conditions. The second 
installment within one year from now; and the third and final installment the year 
thereafter or precisely within two years; for which payments the buyer shall be 
obligated according to the terms of auction to furnish sufficient surety to the 
satisfaction of the seller. Auction fees will be charged to the buyer alone; and in case 
the winning bidder and buyer as aforesaid is not immediately able to furnish sufficient 
surety, then the aforesaid house shall be reauctioned at that winning bidder’s charges 
and costs …and whatever less is comes to be worth, he shall make up the difference 
and pay himself.
232
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That same year, Willem Beeckman put his farm up for auction. He also wanted payment in 
installments of beavers, but he promised to include “two cows and two draft oxen” with his 
farm for the lucky buyer.
233
 
Once a buyer had been found, a contract of sale was signed that transferred the 
property to the buyer. This contract explicitly described the house and/or lot and whatever 
appurtenances were (or were not) included with it, and iterated the final payment agreement 
that the parties had settled on. In 1639, Anthony Jansen and Barent Dircksen signed such 
an agreement for Jansen’s farm near Fort Amsterdam. In it, they agreed that  
First, said Anthony Jansen shall deliver…to Barent Dircksz…who also 
acknowledges that he has bought and this day received from said Anthony, the land 
as it is sowed and fenced, the house and barn, together with all that is fastened by 
earth and nail, except the cherry, peach and all other trees standing on said land, 
which said Anthony reserved for himself and will remove at a suitable time; one 
stallion of two years, one ditto of one year, one wagon, one plow and one harrow 
with wooden teeth. 
For all of which Barent Dircksz shall pay to said Anthony Jansen the sum of 
fifteen hundred and seventy guilders, to be paid in two consecutive years: 
immediately after the receipt of what is above written he, Barent Dircksz, shall pay 
to Anthony Jansen, or his order, one just fourth part of the aforesaid money, and six 
months after the date hereof the second fourth part, and so on one fourth part every 
half year, until the last payment inclusive.
234
 
 
Most importantly, the contract bound the parties and made them legally responsible to one 
another should something go wrong: “For all of which the parties bind their persons and 
properties, movable and immovable, present and future, without any exception, under 
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binding obligation as by law provided.”235 Though the buyer began to administer the property 
and treat it as his own once the contract was signed, he did not receive the deed to the 
property, which conferred full, final ownership, until the contract had been carried to term.  
Selling the Land: Indian Land Tenure in the Hudson Valley 
There is a limit to what scholars can say about indigenous land tenure. Archeological 
sites and European sources shed only dim light on it, and the revelations of the latter are 
contorted by cultural disconnects and biases. Scholars agree that Native peoples were 
territorial and that there were clear boundaries between neighboring peoples prior to 
European contact. Charles A. Bishop holds this view, stating that  
Early historical examples of territoriality suggest that it may have antedated European 
intervention…Territoriality existed to protect local resources [rather than land itself] 
from members of other groups who would have been able, with direct access, to 
circumvent and/or undermine the position of those with whom they had an alliance.
236
 
 
In a similar vein, Tom Arne Midtrød states that “Both Indians and Europeans in the 
[Hudson] Valley took the existence of Indian territoriality for granted.” Robert S. Grumet 
agrees, writing that both peoples “cared deeply about territorial integrity and paid close 
attention to property rights and boundaries.”237 Midtrød is less confident about the extent to 
which “territorial boundaries predate European colonization,” however, stressing that most 
of “the sources dealing with borders and territories derive from the activities of colonial land 
buyers, who needed exact boundaries…to be secure in their titles.”238  
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Indian territoriality, though, was not rigid in the way that European territoriality was, 
with strict boundaries, enclosures, or even exclusive access to resources by one polity or 
individual. It was a fluid dominion in which political boundaries overlapped and neighboring 
peoples shared hunting grounds. Midtrød expounds upon this, writing that 
In precontact times, Indian groups in the Northeast tended to inhabit the land on 
both sides of drainages and river valleys[, but that] [b]eyond  these core territories 
they utilized large hunting and foraging grounds with permeable boundaries that 
allowed several groups to make use of them at once.
239
 
 
Amy C. Schutt agrees, noting that, in the Delaware Valley, “overlapping rights to a particular 
piece of land were apparently quite common.”240 Bishop, too, qualifies the concept of 
territoriality as Indians likely construed it, declaring that  
territorial rules [seem to have applied] only to the right to trade and to obtain 
exchange goods, and not to the right to exploit subsistence necessities…Groups 
appear to have exploited foods seasonally in predetermined areas, but nothing 
suggests that others were prevented access.
241
 
 
Overlapping claims among nations, however, should not be conflated with neutral zones or 
no-man’s lands. Often, one of the groups had a stronger claim to a certain region than its 
neighbors; in such cases, neighbors might be welcome to use the land but certain products 
would be reserved for its true owners. The Shinnecocks of eastern Long Island, Midtrød 
notes, shared hunting rights to the land around the Peconic River with the Yeanococks, but 
“the pelts and fat of drowned bears,” the skins of deer drowned or killed in the River, and 
the baby eaglets found in the area were the exclusive privilege of the Shinnecocks.
242
  
                                                 
239
 Loc cit. 
240
 Schutt, 33. 
241
 Bishop, 49. 
242
 Midtrød, Memory, 47 and 46-48. 
 85 
 
 Beyond having a unique conception of territoriality, Indians in the Northeast 
practiced usufruct, or use-right, ownership.
243
 Unlike Europeans, who held land in absolute 
terms, retaining control over a parcel even when they were not using it, living on it, or 
anywhere near it; Indian peoples possessed land only for as long as they were using it. This 
concept is chiefly intra-tribal and applies to the specific pieces of land on which Indians 
sowed crops or established settlements. Hunting, fishing, and foraging reserves, as we have 
seen, were managed under the greater inter-tribal logic of territoriality, especially since these 
lands would not have been under the constant use necessary to retain usufruct ownership: 
they were not residential lands, and they had to be left untrapped for extended periods to 
allow for the replenishment of beaver, deer, bear, and other game populations. 
 Matthew Dennis, studying the Iroquois, explains usufruct land tenure as follows: “for 
the Iroquois, land could be occupied, used, and shaped, but not really owned. It was shared 
communally, entrusted to the group as a whole and distributed temporarily according to need 
and use.”244 Similarly, William A. Starna boldly declares that  
Indians lacked entirely a concept of land ownership and did not conceive of anything 
approaching the jurisdiction and control assumed by European nation-states over 
their territories on the other side of the Atlantic. For all intents and purposes, the 
world of these native people was absent metes and bounds. In their place, and in that 
of other equally Western legal precepts, stood ‘usufruct’…a claim laid and limited to 
lands on the basis of how they were managed and to what ends…individuals or 
collectives might use or extract resources from a given territory that they did not or 
could not hold in perpetuity for an unspecified period of time.
245
 
 
Janny Venema similarly maintains that 
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Indians were hardly familiar with [the] European idea of land ownership. They 
thought of land in terms of usufruct, whereby some form of social unit—a clan...or 
lineage—held a right to use the land undisturbed, and as long as they did so, others 
recognized this right. People could lay claim not on the land itself, but on the things 
that were on the land during the various season of the year.
246
 
 
This correct acknowledgment of usufruct as Indian land tenure is what leads many scholars 
to assert that Indians signing deeds were transferring only use rights to European settlers, 
whether exclusive or shared, rather than the land itself.
247
 As we have seen, this avowal, though 
very likely true for the earliest deeds contracted by Indians and Europeans, does not hold 
strong weight beyond them, since the former quickly came to understand European land 
tenure more closely and to share this knowledge with other tribes. 
 But the idea of usufruct as Indian land tenure needs other important qualifications. 
Scholars, including those quoted in the previous paragraph, have a tendency to simplify 
Indian land use (and Indian society in general), depicting a serene, conflict-free 
communalism, in which people simply plopped down wherever they liked without any 
complicated red tape or money involved. This was not the case at all. Indian societies had 
their own social organization that extended to their land use. As Robert S. Grumet writes,  
Usafruct [sic] did not mean that Indians thought land was free like air and water open 
to anyone wishing to share it…Usufruct rights were available only to people with rights 
to land who were willing to properly respect local customs and concerns. Land was 
not free to strangers from foreign places who did not have these rights. Such people 
could only accept land as a granted gift [or purchase] or seize it outright.
248
 
 
                                                 
246
 Venema, 40. Also Schutt, 32-34. 
247
 Midtrød, Memory, 72; Schutt, 32-33; Otto, 97; Leavenworth, 281; Silverman, 4 (Otto, Leavenworth, and 
Silverman acknowledge that this mainly applies to the earliest purchases), among numerous others who 
mention land transactions between Indians and Europeans in passing. 
248
 Grumet, Munsee, 84 
 87 
 
Usufruct rights did not preclude complexity in patterns of ownership or the existence of 
individual property claims. 
 What form did this complexity take? Though it varied by region, Indians owned land 
communally, with the tribe owning the extent of a nation’s territory. Bishop has argued that 
communalism among northeastern Algonquian peoples was “a matter of degree,” however, 
and that “the most egalitarian groups appear to have been those furthest north of the Great 
Lakes/St. Lawrence waters.”249 Social structure correlates with land tenure, since egalitarian 
societies endowed chiefs with less power, including the right to alienate tribal land. Kathleen 
J. Bragdon has concluded that “coastal groups living in southern New England in the early 
seventeenth century…were probably best characterized as chiefdoms of marked social 
hierarchy and centralized leadership, while riverine communities were perhaps more self-
sufficient and less hierarchical.”250 The Hudson Valley was such a region, and according to 
Midtrød “sachems did not necessarily have the authority to cede land without approval 
[from] their people.”251 Still, the common thread among Indian societies, however, is that 
sachems managed the distribution of land.
252
 
Indian nations were split into multi-settlement subgroups headed by a sachem (and 
a council of elders) whose duty it was to manage the land, though some of the more hierarchal 
nations like the Wampanoags of southern New England and the Powhatans of the 
Chesapeake also had paramount sachems. The latter collected tribute from the local 
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sachems under their jurisdiction in return for managing foreign affairs and “adjudicating 
sensitive inter-community disputes.”253 Paramount sachems were an additional social rung 
that not all Amerindian societies possessed, however, and that do not seem to have been a 
feature of Hudson Valley societies. Local sachems in the Hudson and Delaware Valleys, 
Grumet writes, “allocate[d] use rights for town sites, planting fields, fishing spots, hunting and 
foraging territories, and other places so long as they were [being] utilized.”254 Siminoff 
maintains that these allotments could go to “commoners, kinsmen, or loyal followers,” could 
be given in return for payment, and could be revoked by the sachem and given to someone 
else.
255
 
According to Midtrød, though, Hudson Valley sachems do not seem to have had 
“particular prerogative” to allocate land; rather, they were influential in land matters.256 The 
Dutch-indigenous deeds support Midtrød’s conclusion, since, as he points out, chiefs 
frequently represented their people in the transactions.
257
 Another finding that agrees with 
Midtrød’s view is the fact that not all the sellers in Dutch-Indian land transactions were 
sachems. Many names appear without that rank attached to them (which the Dutch would 
not have left out if a person was of what they considered high rank), and sometimes sachems 
appear alongside them but are specifically listed as witnesses.
258
 These people were 
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presumably “common Indians,” men and women259 who had individual, often kinship-based 
rights to the land. 
This piece of evidence brings us to another important point about Indian land tenure: 
individual and family landholdings often subdivided Native lands below the level of the 
sachemship.
260
 This is especially true of the Hudson Valley. “Native territories in the Hudson 
Valley,” Midtrød asserts, “were divided into smaller areas of land that were in the possession 
of individuals who held this land on behalf of their families,” and who seem to have sold it 
of their own accord, without needing community consent (beyond that of their families, of 
course).
261
 The deeds show this complexity of ownership: all but one of the transactions 
involve the Dutch and at least two Indian proprietors.
262
 A close analysis of the vended 
territories, especially those that were deeded on the same dates or otherwise near each other 
in time, shows that the Dutch had to seek out the specific owners and families who held 
rights to a particular tract to complete a large purchase. For example, a set of deeds executed 
on October 4, 1663, gave Volckert Janssen and Jan Tomassen possession of Aepjen’s Island 
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on the Hudson River. Each deed was signed by two different, seemingly unrelated owners, 
and each one deeded half of the Island.
263
 The second deed confirms this: 
At the same time, on the date as before [October 4, 1663], there appeared before 
me, Johannes La Montagne, commissary, in the aforesaid capacity, an Indian and an 
Indian woman, the Indian named Naspaliasn, or else, Pofponick, and the Indian 
woman named Pasies, owners of the south end of Aepiens island named Schotack, 
who declare to have sold…[to] Volckert Janssen and Jan Tomassen, their heirs or 
assigns, the said south end of the aforesaid island, being the largest half…so that the 
entire island…belongs to them, grantees, for the sum of f500 [florins] in beavers…264 
 
The deeds also show that kinship-based individual usufruct allotments could be 
multi-generational and inherited, in a manner somewhat akin to English copyholding, in 
which tenants held rights—a copyhold—to a plot of manor land for two or three lifetimes (the 
manor itself being a lord’s permanent freehold). Most of them, for example, mention that 
would-be inheritors could no longer make claims to the land in question, since it was being 
sold permanently. Though such a general provision could just be a marker of Dutch 
convention, there is some evidence to suggest otherwise: the first deed for Staten Island, 
dated August 10, 1630, specifically charges the Indian sellers with delivering the land “free 
from all claims…challenges and troubles either against the aforesaid Wissipoack, when he 
has reached his majority or against other claimants.”265 Though Wissipoack was among the 
eight sellers themselves, he seems to have had a unique status as someone who was not yet a 
                                                 
263
 Conveyance of a Piece of Land by Wattawit and Pepewitsie to Volckert Janssen and Jan Tomassen, 4 Oct 
1663; and Conveyance of a Piece of Land by Naspahan and Pasies to Volckert Janssen and Jan Tomassen, 4 
Oct 1663, in Fort Orange Records, 1654-1679, ed. Charles T. Gehring and Janny Venema (Syracuse: Holland 
Society of New York/Syracuse University Press, 2009), 303-304 and 304-305. 
264
 Conveyance of a Piece of Land by Naspahan and Pasies to Volckert Janssen and Jan Tomassen, 4 Oct 1663, 
in 304. 
265
 Purchase of Staten Island from Indians for Michiel Paauw, 10 Aug 1630, in Early American Indian 
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, vol. VII, New York and New Jersey Treaties, 1609-1682, ed. Alden 
T. Vaughan (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1995), 24-25. 
 91 
 
full partner in the land being transferred but whose interests had to be acknowledged by his 
kinsmen. Faren R. Siminoff agrees that land could be inherited in Indian societies, stating 
that a sachem “could make…allotment[s] for life or attach hereditary rights to [them].” He 
even goes as far as to declare that “many…allotments were made in acknowledgement of [an] 
individual’s or family’s loyalty and continued service to the sachemship.”266 
But the most important characteristic of Indian land tenure is its fluidity. Indian land 
ownership was very complex, operating on many levels simultaneously, but certain levels of 
ownership receded into the background depending on the occasion. This is especially true 
of the land deals made with Europeans. The multi-owner transactions directly visible in the 
deeds are complex in their own right, but often they seem to be condensed versions of a 
complex of overlapping individual, lineage, and sachemship claims that had to be reconciled 
to be able to make dealings with the newcomers, who did not own land in this way and who 
would have been confused by it. Midtrød acknowledges this and states that, “it may be 
presumed that preceding large land transaction, complex negotiations among individuals and 
families with land rights took place.”267 This makes much sense and can be compared to the 
way that Indian communities pooled individual contributions in the days before a diplomatic 
meeting. Everything seems abstractly communal to a person who has not seen the extensive 
individual labors that are the foundation of consensus. 
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Dutch-Indian Land Transactions, 1630-1664: Indianized Rituals of Sale and Negotiation 
When they arrived in the Hudson Valley, the Dutch collided with an oral culture in 
which the spoken word had serious meaning but had to be underwritten by subsequent acts 
of gift-giving. For their part, the Natives encountered a culture in which spoken words held 
less weight and the written word was the final word. But whatever form official agreements 
took, both cultures sealed them with exchanges, whether their driving logic was economic, 
diplomatic, social, or spiritual. The Dutch and the Indians of New Netherland both held 
leverage in the early seventeenth century; both could take their business and strategic 
friendships elsewhere. Agreements between such parties can only be reached if there is a 
moment of alignment between the two groups, since neither can press the other. But any 
formal agreement is ultimately meaningless—and by extension null and void—if the same web 
of cultural conventions and legal repercussions does not bound its constituents.  
 In buying land, the Dutch seem to have realized this from the beginning. The first 
set of instructions given to Willem Verhulst explicitly commanded that  
In case any Indians should be living on…or make any claim...upon any…places that 
are of use to us, they must not be driven away by force or threats, but by good words 
be persuaded to leave, or be given something therefor to their satisfaction, or else be 
allowed to live among us, a contract being made thereof and signed by them in their 
manner, since such contracts upon other occasions may be very useful to the 
Company.
268
 [emphasis mine] 
 
In this early excerpt, the Dutch’s inexperience with indigenous culture beyond what is related 
to economic exchange is evident. Though by this point the Dutch were aware that the 
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indigenous societies in the area were not literate, they assumed that Indians had their own 
ways of formalizing contracts and sought to use those conventions to make agreements that 
were truly binding. Coming from a written tradition, WIC officials back in Amsterdam 
probably could not imagine closing a deal without a signature, and this is evident in the way 
they phrased their orders to the Director. Whatever arrangement the WIC may have 
envisioned for making land deals with Native peoples, these early directions set the tone for 
the purchases that would be made through New Netherland’s existence. It was one of 
accommodation—of making agreements mutually intelligible for the sake of trade, peace, and 
validity. 
 Between 1630 and 1664, the Dutch and local Indians put their marks and signatures 
to at least 40 deeds for the transfer of land to the newcomers. While these documents might 
look very European on the surface, a closer look reveals them to be the products of the 
colonial world, of a cross-cultural frontier. One of the most important differences between 
European deeds and Indian deeds is that the latter included a transfer of sovereignty with 
title to the land.
269
 If a Dutch person bought land in England, it remained under English rule. 
Land purchased in Indian country, on the other hand, would no longer be subject to Indian 
law. It would come under Dutch law and become part of New Netherland. This provision is 
never explicitly stated in the deed texts, but it was a given. Neither the Dutch nor Indians 
would live under each other’s laws or assimilate to each other’s societies. They were 
interested in exchange and alliances, and neither was strong enough to subjugate the other. 
Besides, to live under one culture’s law would have been difficult given the two groups’ 
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different land-use practices and especially Dutch inflexibility regarding individual ownership 
and plot size. This exclusively colonial phenomenon can be read as a sign of respect for 
Indian sovereignty and as an attempt to coexist peacefully in the name of trade. Dutch law 
and practice would bind Dutch people and vice versa, except when crimes were committed 
across cultures, in which case the offending Swanneken or Indian would be turned in to the 
aggrieved society for justice according to their laws.
270
 
 While the law of the landowner’s society would reign supreme on their plot, the 
deeds and the negotiations surrounding a sale were a malleable zone of accommodation in 
which two kinds of land tenure were recognized. The agreements recognized Indian forms 
of ownership, Indian customs surrounding land transferal, and Indian conventions
271
 related 
to land. When, after negotiating the price (informally or at an auction), Dutch people signed 
away title to land among themselves, it was a relatively simple affair. The document was 
prepared; it was perhaps read aloud for the not-infrequent illiterate party to a transaction; 
buyer, seller, and official witness affixed signatures and/or marks to it; all parties retained a 
copy; and the deal was done. The agreement was irrevocable unless there was a clause within 
it that specifically allowed for a change of heart within an allotted timeframe. The parties to 
the transaction would not have to meet again unless a payment plan had been arranged or 
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one of the parties violated the terms of the sale, in which case they would meet as adversaries 
in court. It was not a colorful event and only the signed document allows it to be described 
as ceremonial. 
 This was not the case with the transactions that occurred between Dutch and Indian 
people. As has been explained, Indians used land as a diplomatic and social tool, allocating 
it to create intimacy between people and nations, much in the way that gift exchanges of 
wampum and other goods distributed at home and at diplomatic meetings did. A sale was 
like a political meeting or treaty signing in that it was an occasion not only for formal gift-
giving, but a special opportunity to create intimacy where a new acquaintanceship still stood.  
The Dutch-Indian deeds are largely laconic about the event of the sale itself, simply 
documenting the terms of the agreement and rarely contextualizing it. For example, the 1630 
deed to Michiel Paauw for Ahasimus and Aressick simply states that “on [November 22, 
1630,]…before us in their own proper persons, came and appeared, Kikitoauw and Afarouw, 
Virginians, Inhabitants and joint owners of the land…,” who agreed to the sale “for and in 
consideration of certain parcels of goods.” The last line reads, “Done at Manahattas 
[Manhattan] in the Fort Amsterdam this 22
nd
 day of Nov., in the year 1630.”272 The 1639 deed 
for Kekeskick/Yonkers has a similar brevity to it: “This day…appeared before me[,] Cornelis 
van Tienhoven, Secretary in New Netherland, Tequemet, Rechgawac, Pachamiens, owners 
of Kekeskick, who…declare…[to] have transferred…[the said parcel]…Done at Fort 
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Amsterdam , the 3
rd
 of August 1639.”273 The 1633 deed with the Pequot chief, “Wapyquart 
or Tattoepan,” did not even include such a morsel of detail. Instead, it declared that, “[Jacob 
van] Curler, and the sachem named Wapyquart or Tattoepan, chief of the Sockenames river, 
and owner of the Fresh [Connecticut] river of New Netherland…have amicably agreed for 
the purchase and sale of the tract named Sickajoock.”274 Read alone, the deeds imply that the 
Dutch-Indian land sales were quick, almost coincidental, one-day sign-and-dash affairs.  
But land sales between Indians and Dutchmen were no such thing. Though some of 
the earliest purchases may have may have been spontaneous and relatively quick, a more 
involved custom was soon established that was unique to the Dutch-indigenous cultural 
frontier. Historian Janny Venema, reconstructing the development of Beverwijck and Brant 
van Slichtenhorst’s purchases from the Mahicans on behalf of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, writes 
that Dutch-Indian land transactions were often accompanied by multi-day rendezvous in 
which large groups of Indians lodged right inside settlers’ houses, the patroon’s house, or at 
“Indian houses” built especially for such visits.275  
On these occasions, ample feasting, drinking, smoking (a mandatory prelude to any 
formal occasion in Indian society), and gift-giving apart from what the sale entailed took place 
at the expense of the Dutch.
276
 For example, the Mahican chief, Aepjen, and his entourage 
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of men, women, and children stayed in the patroon’s house for a few days during van 
Slichtenhorst’s separate purchases of the Paponicack Kil/Muitzes Kil, Catskill, and Claverack 
in 1648 and 1649. During the sale of the latter, 50 Indians reportedly lodged at the patroon’s 
house for three days and had to be fed and entertained. Further presents of victuals also had 
to be given for the road, so that “the end would also be good.”277 The Dutch also had to be 
ready to host the sellers multiple times preceding and following the sale, which Indians 
“celebrated with many visits to, and entertainment in, the patroon’s house.”278 The Indians 
probably reasoned that they were more than welcome to this kind of hospitality, since they 
had given the newcomers the right to settle on their land and since they had, presumably, 
become more than acquaintances to them in granting such a privilege. No deal would be 
closed (or kept) if the Dutch were not generous hosts or if they tried to hurry their guests out 
of town. The Dutch, therefore, were compelled to observe Indian customs surrounding 
formal meetings and gift exchanges between nations, under which a transfer of land fell. 
  The process of negotiation was another area in which colonial, cross-cultural 
practices diverged from intra-Dutch ways. Like other European peoples, the Dutch settled 
terms and prices and then signed contracts that fixed them and legally held their participants 
to them. In the case of a large piece of land encompassing many individual lots, separate 
arrangements would be made with each of the owners until the whole desired piece had been 
purchased. Negotiations with Indian sellers were a lot more complicated due to the nature 
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of Indian land tenure, in which more than a few people could have rights to the same piece 
of land, and not in the form of neatly subdivided plots within it. The Dutch could not have 
drafted a separate deed with every single person who had a stake in a piece of land because 
of the fuzziness of boundaries and the mutability/temporality of individual holdings. 
Moreover, even the holder of an individual/family plot could not sell it on their own, since 
they still operated within a greater framework of communal ownership: anyone considering 
alienating land needed to consult their children, who would be barred from making use of 
the land in the future, as well as other kinsmen who might be sharing the land at the time or 
who might have other plans for it. 
The Dutch-Indian deed, with its large number of sellers acting “rato caverende” for 
all others who held an interest in the land being sold, was a deed modified for the Indian 
sellers as best as possible. Indian land was neither equally owned by all parties, which would 
have called for one deed that identified all the owners, nor distinctly independently owned, 
which would have required a separate deed for each tract. The Dutch-Indian was also a 
custom fit in that it allowed for a range of Indian ownership scenarios. The 1630 deed for 
land on the Hudson River, for example, explicitly acknowledged one owner’s individual 
claim to a larger plot that was being sold: 
before us appeared and presented themselves in their proper persons, Kottamack, 
Nawanemit, Abantzeene, Sagiskzva and Kanamoack, owners and proprietors of their 
respective parcels of land extending up the river, south and north, from the said fort 
[Orange] to a little south of Moeneminnes Castle, belonging to the aforesaid 
proprietors jointly and in common, and the land called Semesseeck, belonging to the 
aforesaid Nawanemit individually…279 
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While all the proprietors are described as having individual, “respective parcels of land” 
within the land being sold, they are also called joint owners of the greater tract. Nawanemit, 
however, seems to have had a claim stronger than what may have been considered typical 
individual use rights. His specific parcel is singled out as being owned even more 
“individually.” Simultaneously, he possesses the greater tract in co-ownership, since he is 
only separated from the group of signatories after the clause describing that relationship. 
The Dutch buyers seem to have understood that there was a limit to how well they 
could understand such a complex system of landownership, for they allowed much of the 
negotiation to be conducted internally and indirectly by the small subgroup of owners who 
were explicitly named in the deed. The terms of many of the Indian deeds attest to the 
process of Dutch recognition of and adjustment to Indian land tenure in the negotiation 
process. In the earliest Indian deed, dated July 11, 1630, Quesquaeskous, Eesanques, and 
Siconesius and some unspecified “inhabitants of their village” sold land on the Delaware 
River to Samuel Godyn “by special authority of their superior and with the consent of the 
community there.”280 This early simple description of the Indians’ communal hold on the 
land exposes the Dutch cultural lacuna where Indian land matters are concerned. A nameless 
“superior” is assumed to be involved and a vague “community” is understood to have agreed 
to the sale.  
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A slightly later deed to Godyn and Samuel Bloemmaert for Cape May dated June 3, 
1631, shows a clearer understanding of Indian land tenure on the part of the Dutch: in this 
transaction, Sawowouwe, Wuoyt, Pemhake, Mekowetick, Techepewoya, Mathamel, 
Sacoock, Anehoopoen, Janqueno, and Pokahake sold the land “in proportion of their own 
shares and for all the other owners in regard to their shares of the same land.”281 This deed 
recognizes Indian land tenure’s relativity and its individual dimension within a broader 
communal possession. Both the named grantors and the other owners that they are 
representing are described as having more than an amorphous shared hold on it: they have 
“shares” whose equality is not assumed, though the specifics are still left to the imagination. 
A 1636 deed to Jacobus van Corlear is even more interesting. In it, the sellers of the 
land are differentiated from two named witnesses who are also sachems: 
…before us personally appeared Tenkirauw, Ketamau, Ararijkan, Asvachkou, 
Suarinkehink, Wappinttawachkenis, [and] Ehetyl, as owners, in presence of 
Penhawis Cakapeteyno, as chiefs over the districts and declare, voluntarily and 
advisedly by special order of the rulers and with the consent of the community there, 
…to have transferred…[to] Jacobus van Corlear the middlemost of the three flats 
belonging to them…282 
 
This deed returns to the vagueness of the first deed since it does not describe the land as 
being owned in differentiated portions held by individuals/families. Simultaneously, 
however, the mention of the two high-ranking witnesses as distinct from the so-called 
“common Indian” owners (for their names are not followed by political designations) is a 
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sign of Dutch understanding, on some level, that not every Indian in a nation had particular 
rights to every morgen of its collective territory. Though the clauses by which Indian sellers 
guaranteed that the community and other co-owners of a parcel had been consulted seem 
perfunctory looking at the body of deeds, they are a unique stipulation not present in intra-
Dutch deeds. It is a stipulation that is the result of two cultures of land tenure coming in 
contact. Realizing that their system of land transferal could not fully account for the range of 
ownerships of Indian land, the Dutch stepped back and waited for indirect, internal 
negotiation to occur within Indian communities and then tried to ensure that everyone really 
had been consulted by adding an appropriate clause to the standard Indian deed format. 
 The community- or co-owner-consent clause also acted as a legal safeguard against 
possible complaints in the future. The Dutch were ultimately relying on Indian signatories 
to follow proper form, as dictated by Indian culture, in procuring everyone’s consent before 
signing the deeds and needed to counteract the vulnerability inherent in such a process. But 
there was not merely business savvy at work in this provision. Unanimous Indian consent 
really was required in order to settle a piece of land in the Dutch way, which required 
considerable time and capital, without being attacked by angry claimants. In theory, 
individual deeds with each owner, face-to-face, would have been the ultimate guarantee of 
peace and unchallenged possession of a tract; however, the nature of Indian land tenure and 
its esoteric quality to the Dutch mind made such arrangements impractical, inappropriate, 
and breach-able in their incompatibility. Allowing the potentially numerous Indian owners 
of a piece of land to internally come to an agreement on selling and permitting that deeds be 
signed by just a subset of a tract’s owners was an accommodation that better insured a 
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purchase at the end of the day. It must be acknowledged, though, that the system did create 
the potential for astute Indian brokers to sell land that did not belong to them; but these were 
risky crimes that often eventually came to light and were settled. 
 Further proof of Dutch adaptation of the negotiation process to suit Indian land 
tenure lies in the existence of deeds that acknowledge unfinished negotiations within the 
community selling the land, even though a deed is supposed to be the product of a finalized 
transaction. Five of the extant deeds have such arrangements. For example, in 1631, 
Papsickene, Kemptas, Nancoutamhat, and Sickenosen agreed to sell Kiliaen van Rensselaer 
additional land on the Hudson River to expand his patroonship. Reading through most of 
the deed, everything seems finalized until one reaches the end of the deed: after making the 
sellers give their word to deliver the land to its buyers free of claims, it demands that the 
sellers “have this sale and transfer approved, ratified and acknowledged as valid by the 
remaining represented coproprietors.”283 The deeds for Hoboken, Ahasimus/Aressick, and 
Cape May County contain similarly-worded clauses.
284
  
The 1663 deed for all of the Navasink Indians’ unsold lands (located in central New 
Jersey) is the most detailed example of the Dutch allowing for post-deed-signing negotiations, 
which makes sense for such a large and gainful purchase. Though “chiefs Matanoo, 
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Barrenach, [and] Mechat, brother to and deputed by Pajpemoor, [all] empowered by 
Pasachynom, Menarhohondoo, Syacakeska and the aforesaid Pojpemoor,” had signed the 
deed and, in effect, agreed to the sale, it was not complete. The document states:  
The price of the purchase and the mode of payment have been deferred, until the 
aforesaid chiefs and some other owners of the said unpurchased and not conveyed 
lands shall have appeared here before the Director-General and Council, to close 
the bargain completely and then to receive the payment for it. Meanwhile the 
aforesaid chiefs declare the said lands conveyed…and to have received and accepted 
in confirmation thereof each a red blanked, to wit[,] Mattano Barrenach Mechat 
Passachynom Pojpemoor Menarhohond[oo] Sycakeska [and] Piewecherenoes alias 
Han [who signed as a witness].
285
  
 
All the signatories and those who had given them power of attorney closed the sale on 
December 12, even receiving a little gift for their trouble, but the document clearly 
acknowledged that not everyone whose interests were tied up in the remaining Navasink 
lands had yet consented to the sale. The deed does, of course, have the tone of a done deal, 
as do the provisos of the other four deeds. Stuyvesant probably did not expect the remaining 
proprietors to annul the agreement, and the Navasinks did demand 4000 guilders for the 
lands a few weeks later.
286
 The point still stands that the Dutch were effectively yielding to 
Indian land tenure’s extensive negotiation protocol in purchasing Indian land. 
A deed signed by Pamitepiet and Tatankenat on June 5, 1662 is excluded from the 
count because it does not contain any such explicit clause, but there was a note appended to 
it that reported that,  
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Today, the 11th of June anno 1664, there appeared before me…an Indian named 
Sickaneeck or by the Dutch named Teunis, co-owner of the land described above, 
who acknowledges and declares that on the 5th of June 1662 together with Pamitepiet 
alias Keesie Weij, he has sold the land described above…and that he was fully 
satisfied and paid therefor, freeing him from all claims of other Indians…287 
 
Sickaneeck was not a seller on the deed itself. Though the original signers had transferred 
the land “having authority from the co-owners,”288 it is possible that internal negotiations went 
on for some time after the sale, since Sickaneeck did not declare his consent until two years 
later. That Sickaneeck came to seal a transaction that his co-owners had technically sealed 
for him long ago, and that the Dutch carefully recorded his consent so long after the deed 
had been signed, shows that the Dutch had a degree of understanding of and respect for the 
communal aspect of Indian land tenure and the complex negotiations that had to be 
undertaken in selling a tract. After all, the Dutch could have claimed full irrevocable 
possession under the careful terms of the original deed. Instead, their record of Sickaneeck’s 
long-awaited consent shows that the sale could have been dissolved without it—that there was 
a bi-cultural standard at work. It was not merely an additional surety. Sickaneeck’s actions 
support this theory. Why would he have made the effort to register his consent so long after 
the fact if it did not make a difference?  
Flexibility with the manner and pace of negotiations worked in favor of the Dutch, 
who could get a proverbial foot in the door by procuring the consent of those who were 
already interested in selling land and extracting from them a promise to convince the other 
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owners to sell, too. It also protected Indian sellers, who could effectively charge that the 
conditions for the sale had not been met and cite documented proof, which would void the 
transaction. The only alternative to patience and accommodation in closing a land deal was 
war, its attendant economic downturn for the WIC, and a small chance of winning the right 
to the land by conquest (particularly small in northern New Netherland, where Indian 
peoples remained influential until the Dutch surrender). Any settlements erected in 
conquered or otherwise ill-gotten territory, moreover, were almost guaranteed an existence 
bedeviled by the constant threat of Indian attack since the land would have been blatantly 
stolen.  
The extant portions of Adriaen van der Donck’s petition concerning his 1645 land 
grant are a testament to this truth. Van der Donck relates that he could not return to his 
homestead in Saeghkil for nine weeks due to Kieft’s continuing war with Munsee groups, 
some of whom lived near him. He also mentions that “the Indians were reclaiming [the land], 
saying that it belonged to them, which was bought from the owners with the knowledge and 
in the presence of the director and councilors of New Netherland.” This is clearly an instance 
of a transaction that was not properly negotiated with all the appropriate parties, or that may 
have been rushed with insufficient clarification of the sale being given. The petition shows 
that land bought improperly was land whose settlement could not be consummated. 
Negotiations had to be conducted in the Indian way so that Indians would emerge with an 
understanding of what they were doing and so that no one would be left out of the sale of 
their land, over which they could and would become angry and potentially violent. Van der 
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Donck was granted another plot to live on, and this after the poor man had devoted time to 
“establishing there saw mills, a farm and a plantation.”289 
The deeds are loud proclamations of the Dutch dependence on Indian internal 
negotiation and full consent to settle the lands they had purchased from them. A full 18 of 
the 40 deeds specifically attempt to command the Indian sellers to promise to “free and 
warrant the…lands against all claims any other Indians might make” and otherwise protect 
Dutch claims.
290
 A 1630 deed is more plain in its language, simply asking that the grantors 
“protect against eviction from the aforesaid land.”291 Cases like van der Donck’s seem to have 
occurred enough to compel the Dutch buyers of land between Wiehaeken and Sickakes to 
demand in 1658 that “if it should happen that in future time, any of the Dutch, by any 
Indians, should be damaged because they claim not to have been compensated for the land, 
they the sellers, do promise to repair and satisfy the damages.”292  
Ultimately, however, there was a limit to the protections that a deed or even a co-
owner’s word could provide. Petrus Stuyvesant’s advice to Andries Hudde, who was 
considering purchasing the Narraticonse Kil from its indigenous owners, was to “take care 
that the proper procedures be observed in the transfer; and that the same be done, drawn 
                                                 
289
 Petition of Adriaen van der Donck Concerning Land Granted Him at Saeghkil in 1645, after 1652 (date 
unknown), in New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch/New Netherland Documents Series, vol. XI, 
Correspondence, 1647-1653, ed. and trans. Charles T. Gehring (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 
204-205. This document was badly burned by fire and only excerpts of it remain legible. 
290
 Indian Deed for Land Between Wiehaeken and Sickakes, 30 Jan 1658, in Early American Indian 
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, vol. VII, New York and New Jersey Treaties, 1609-1682, ed. Alden 
T. Vaughan (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1995), 165. 
291
 Certificate of Purchase from the Indians of Land on the West Side of the Hudson River from Smacks Island 
to Moenemin's Castle and of Tract of Land on the East Side opposite Castle Island and Fort Orange, 13 Aug 
1630, in New York State Library Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, Being the Letters of Kiliaen van 
Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck, ed. and trans. A. J. 
F. Van Laer (Albany: University of the State of New York [Press], 1908), 168. 
292
 Ibid., 166. 
 107 
 
up and signed by as many sachems and witnesses as you are able to secure, and by Christians 
who are not in the service of the Company.”293 The more people there were who could 
remember a transaction, the less likely there was to be conflict, especially since witnesses 
were the recordkeepers of non-literate societies.
294
 But more important was his suggestion to 
follow “proper procedures.” Stuyvesant, living in a colonial world but still a Dutchman in 
mind, probably did not realize how Indianized the “proper” protocol had become in New 
Netherland. The reality was that the Dutch had to make a concerted effort to follow Indian 
conventions—Indian law—as it pertained to the possession of land and its transfer.  
Accommodating Two Sets of Land Laws: Unique Stipulations in Dutch-Indian Deeds 
The reason that a deed could never guarantee that conflicts over a claim or a price 
would not arise is because they retained a fundamentally European trait in their texts: they 
were settled, unalterable agreements, using phrases like “now and forever” and, “now and 
hereafter to the day of judgment” to convey their finality.295 This trait in European and Euro-
Indian deeds is a symbol of a major difference between Indian and European land law. 
Indians thought of land in much more fluid ways, and this was particularly true of land deals, 
whether they were intra- or inter-tribe allotments or sales to Europeans. As has been 
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mentioned, Indians probably construed the earliest land deals with Europeans as grants of 
(exclusive or shared) use-rights or otherwise temporary alienations. This is because Indians 
viewed land transfers as renewable, continuing agreements requiring regular gifts, much like 
a European lease. These effective leases, however, were unique in that they had the strategic 
purpose of forging social and political ties rather than making a profit as a landlord.
296
 
Though Indians soon realized that their new allies considered sales permanent 
cessions of the land, their land tenure naturally did not undergo any sudden extreme 
restructuring. Neither did the Dutch radically alter their own notions of landownership after 
they realized that purchases of Indian land came with unique conditions and strings attached. 
But the degree of change is key. Though their respective societies’ land tenures remained 
relatively unchanged during the seventeenth century, the Dutch and Indians struck a 
compromise in the transactional frontier once they became fully aware of their mutually 
divergent practices. The Dutch, for their part, were not fond of sharing land that was being 
purchased to subdivide into individual farmsteads. Neither did they want to lease the land 
from its proprietors, which, in their minds, would make them indefinitely subject to Indian 
laws and ways. The unique recurring provisions of the Dutch-Indian deeds and Dutch 
reactions to Indians straying from those terms are evidence of a middle ground in land tenure 
and laws that was struck to successfully conduct land deals. 
After they formally sold a piece of land, Indians often did two things that clashed with 
Dutch land conventions: they remained on the alienated land and they resold it after some 
time had elapsed. This was particularly an issue with land that was not in use—that had not 
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been settled by its new owners—and an issue whose roots lay in the Indian notion of usufruct 
ownership: unused tribal lands were subject to reallocation by the sachem and/or community 
and to use by the nation. There was no such thing as pure individual absenteeism, in which 
the land lay unused, with the owner far away and no “challenge” made to their title, in the 
form of use by someone else. In the case of the newcomers, Indian sellers may have seen 
the unused tracts as signs that a sale had not been consummated, since use was the ultimate 
sign of possession in Indian societies. Moreover, the expectation that land deals needed 
renewal, which made them effective leases, made these lands even more vulnerable to 
continued Indian use, eventual re-usurpation, and resale.  
Naturally, the Dutch were frustrated by what they considered breaches of contract 
(really, they were misunderstandings about land tenure). For example, in an “[e]xtract of the 
general letter from New Netherland dated October 30, 1655, signed by Petrus Stuyvesant, 
Nicasius de Sille, [and] La Montaigne,” the writers complained that, “…the savages…sell as 
often as there appear purchasers…”297 The renewable, dissolvable nature of Indian land sales 
also created issues with their English neighbors. In one memorable instance, Governor Eaton 
accused the Dutch of taking advantage of Indian practices to take the land from under the 
feet of the English: 
that Dauid Prouoost in that parte of Long Isl: hath indeauored to take (as it were) the 
ground from vnder the feet of the English, purchasing lands which the Indians haue 
long since passed ouer, & unto which the Engls. for many yeares have had a knowne 
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& unquestioned right, & had given a price for the same, till the Indians (Convinced 
by the English of theyre unrighteousnes) retourned his pay.
298
 
 
This understandable frustration with what was essentially Indian land law also comes 
through in the language that found its way into some of the deeds to prevent such problems. 
Three of the existing agreements specifically required Indian sellers to leave the land 
immediately following the sale. The 1652 deed for Nayeck, Long Island, required that “the 
Indians, and their descendants remove immediately from the land now occupied by 
them…and never return to live in the limits of the district at New Amsterdam.”299 The 1658 
deed for land between Wiehacken and Sickakes demanded that the sellers “depart and 
remove by the first convenient opportunity, off the lands; and that none of their nation shall 
come and continue to dwell upon it without knowledge and consent of the Director General 
and Councillors.”300 In a 1655 grant of land by Sachem Amattehooren to Stuyvesant in 
calculated retaliation against the Swedes who had settled there without concluding a 
purchase, Amattehooren retained hunting and fishing rights to the land, but he also pledged 
not to “plant corn thereupon except with his consent.”301 The Dutch may have eventually 
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considered continued Indian hunting and fishing on the land acceptable because they did 
not override Dutch possession or clash with their own use of the land in the way that 
agricultural and residential usufruct rights did.  
Other agreements were not quite as pointed, but they were aimed toward the same 
“abuses” made by the Indians. The deed for the eastern half of Westchester County made 
the signatories agree that the buyers could “do with [the land] as they please, without being 
molested by them, the sellers or any one of them.”302 The treaty made with the Takapousha 
Indians in 1656 also granted usufruct rights to the Takapousha, namely the right to continue 
to live in the area, but it specifically reminded them not to bother the English community at 
Hemsteede, which had lawfully purchased the land earlier: “Inhabitants of Hemsteede…shall 
injoy [the land they’ve purchased] without Mollestation…of person or estate.”303 
“Molestation” likely included attempting to farm or erect abodes on land that Dutch and 
English settlers were not farming at given time or that otherwise lay open to use according to 
Indian land tenure. 
The Dutch also tried to combat Indian land law through clauses that attempted to 
stop them from reselling deeded land. In another grant of Swedish-inhabited land to the 
Dutch that was solemnized by both handshake and signature, Sachem Wappanghzewan was 
asked to give his word that he would not “transport nor sell to any other Nation the lands 
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aforesaid.”304 Sachem Amattehooren’s documented grant had also contained the same 
proviso, in addition to having him guarantee that the lands “were never before sold or 
conveyed to any nation in the world.”305 This last stipulation was likely added in an effort to 
avoid unnecessary problems with the English and Swedes, even as the Dutch fought to retain 
and even expand their foothold in the Northeast. 
Indians also tried to combat the Dutch land conventions through informed 
negotiation with their buyers. The fruits of this concerted bargaining appear in the form of 
the explicit written enshrining of usufruct rights to the transferred lands in some deeds. The 
first instance of encoded Indian retention of usufruct rights occurred with the 1639 sale of 
Queens County on Long Island. The deed explicitly states that the land was ceded “under 
the express condition, that [the sachem]…may be allowed, with his people and friends, to 
remain upon the aforesaid land, plant corn, fish, hunt and make a living there as well as he 
can.”306 Terms like these are unheard of in pure Dutch deeds. Under Dutch land tenure and 
law, such a sale was hardly a sale at all, in spite of the importance to the Dutch of holding 
legal title to the land. But on the Dutch-Indian frontier, where two forms of land use and 
convention were in regular use, Dutch and Indians both had to fold and create a shared land 
tenure for land transactions on the Dutch-Indian colonial frontier. 
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The sale of Queens County, however, was also unique in that Sachem Mechowot 
and his people agreed to “place themselves under the protection of the said Lords, who will 
grant to them all possible assistance and favor by their representative in this country” and in 
that the sachem agreed to transfer “all his…patrimonial lands and the jurisdiction thereof.”307 
In effect, these Indians were ceding their sovereignty in exchange for an alliance that they 
expected would bring them protection and that would not interrupt their use of their 
“patrimonial lands.” It is likely that these Indians, living in southern New Netherland and 
particularly Long Island, where combined Dutch and English settlement quickly began to 
close in on the local Indians, saw this sale as a way of preemptively avoiding war and surviving 
in an increasingly European world. The sale certainly falls under the traditional use of land 
to cement political alliances and create mutual obligation. But this loss was not incurred from 
an abject position. Rather, the generous usufruct rights (and military protection) that 
Mechowot succeeded in exacting from the Dutch shows that they continued to accommodate 
Indian land tenure even in an area with an increasingly stronger Dutch presence, a marker 
of the reality of continued indigenous influence and the need to yield to it. 
The treaty made with the Takapousha and other Long Island peoples was similar to 
the deed for Queens County in that sovereignty was exchanged for the right “to live in peace 
with All the Dutch and English within this Jurisdiction of the New-netherlands.”308 In this 
case, however, the trade-off occurred specifically with the peoples’ “lands and territories 
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upon Long Iland, soe farr As the Dutch line doth runn,” which suggests that these peoples 
may have possessed other lands besides those on Long Island. The Dutch also promised 
these peoples that they would build a trading post nearby for them to have access to trade 
and that they would keep the peace with them.
309
 These clauses are expressive of some 
Indians’ motivations for maintaining a good relationship with the Dutch, which entailed 
yielding to at least some of their demands. Of course, this was a treaty following the hostilities 
of the Peach War, which was not the case with the much-earlier Queens County deed. The 
Susquehannocks and their Munsee allies had successfully ambushed New Amsterdam, and 
the Indians signing the treaty likely did so feeling at risk of being lumped in with hostile 
groups by the Dutch and subjected to retaliation. On the other hand, the Dutch had 
effectively lost this short war and had learned the importance of being diplomatic in the 
process, as Mark Meuwese has noted.
310
 The treaty’s provisions may have been the result of 
the two peoples making their best attempts at diplomacy. 
One instance of usufruct-right retention was successfully acquired without such a 
compromise. Sachems Amattehooren, Peminackan, Ackehoorn, and Sinquees retained 
hunting and fishing rights for themselves and their people when they granted Stuyvesant the 
land that they were asked not to resell in 1655. Here, the Dutch very clearly accommodated 
Indian land tenure to acquire the land properly, so that the Indians selling it would defend 
their claim. Fair, legal acquisition of land was a part of Dutch efforts to dislodge the Swedes 
from land that they claimed for their colony by invalidating their settlements as built on 
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essentially stolen land. But the legality of the claim could not rest exclusively in Dutch law 
books, or Indian sellers would not defend the claim. 
The notion of Indian-backed claims was not a hollow or false one. The Dutch 
commonly relied on Indians to identify the rightful owner(s) of a given tract of land. There 
are multiple “declarations” by Indians in the record in which the speakers confirmed or 
refuted claims to lands that they had owned or whose sale they had witnessed. This occurred 
at the colonial level, as in Amattehooren’s (spelled “Mattehoorn” in the earlier version of the 
grant for the same land that includes the declaration) and Wappanghzewan’s hybrid 
declaration-grants, in which the sachems refuted Swedish claims to their lands on the 
Delaware River and then presented them to Stuyvesant as a present. Amattehooren and two 
other sachems claimed that the Swedes had only purchased the land that Fort Christina stood 
on and none of the other areas that they had settled, while Wappanghzewan declared that 
Minquaas Kill, where Fort Christina was located, was his property and that the Swedes had 
only offered payment for it a few days ago. Together, the two declaration-grants invalidated 
all of New Sweden’s claims and made the WIC/Dutch the true owners of the land.311  
Reliance on Indians to determine ownership also occurred with ordinary settlers’ 
claims. For example, in 1664, Jan Tomassen and Volckert Janssen called on Queskimiet, 
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Aepie, Wickepe, and Kleijn Davidtie to identify the rightful owner of a piece of land at 
Gojer’s Kil. Their declaration reads as follows: 
First, they say that it is eighteen years ago that Jacob Janssen Flodder bought the 
Gojers kil, but no land with it, only a small piece to the north of the aforesaid kil, 
which was allowed to him to make a garden, for which they, witnesses owners have 
received only one piece of cloth for rent. The witnesses being asked whether Jacob 
Janssen Flodder has bought any land at Schotack, unanimously declare no, but that 
he only has had a small piece of land that they had consented to him for one year to 
sow oats upon…they declare Jan Tomassen and Volckert Janssen to be the true 
owners, who have bought the same and paid for it, and nobody else.
312
 
 
In this brief excerpt, we can see Indian land tenure and convention at work in the variety of 
land agreements that they reference, two of which were temporary allotments/leases. Indian 
accommodation of Dutch notions of permanent landownership is also visible, since they did 
declare Tomassen and Janssen permanent owners by virtue of a formal purchase and 
significant payment. Most importantly, Dutch respect for their affidavit is present: the men 
made their declaration at Fort Orange, in the presence of four WIC court magistrates, who 
transcribed their words. Officials and Indians both signed/marked the document, and it 
thereby became an official document with which to settle the dispute.  
 The need to use land in peace following its purchase and to maintain good relations 
with Indians required that it be purchased with their full consent. For both the WIC and 
individual Dutch purchasers, Indian comprehension of and agreement with a transaction was 
paramount to avoid losing a holding through attack or claims that it had not been purchased. 
Once both parties fully understood what the sales represented to one another, adjustments 
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in keeping with particularly important tenets of Dutch and Indian land use and law 
sometimes had to be made to agreements’ terms to close a deal. Thus, encoded Indian 
retention of usufruct rights and Dutch stipulation that Indians cease using the land right away 
are manifestations of attempts both to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise that would 
result in a sale and to push for the land conventions of their respective societies to be honored 
by the other. 
Yielding to Indian Land Tenure: Effective Leasing of Indian Land 
 Though there are only a few documented, legally protected instances of Indians 
retaining usufruct rights, the complaints of and protections enshrined in some deeds by the 
Dutch shows that Indians often retained de facto if not de jure usufruct rights. Sometimes, 
such rights morphed into outright Indian reclamation of purchased lands, particularly in the 
case of land that had been abandoned or that had never been settled. Under the logic of 
usufruct, such land reverted to its original proprietors, who would assert ownership through 
use. Land may also have been reclaimed for lack of further payment, since land agreements 
were considered to need renewal to remain in effect. The Dutch, of course, did not 
understand this, since purchases to them entailed one-time payments or else a series of 
installments. Leases were an entirely different category in their land tenure. But sales and 
leases blended messily together in Indian land tenure, if they were not one and the same 
thing. In some cases, the Dutch found themselves forced to abide by Indian convention (even 
if they did not understand it) by repurchasing lands. 
 118 
 
 Scholars are well aware that Munsee Indians sold Staten Island three times, twice to 
the Dutch in 1630 and 1657, and once to the English in 1670.
313
 Historian Janny Venema 
has also noted resales by the Mahicans: Papsickene and some other Indians sold land to the 
Dutch in 1631, the Dutch never settled it, and his heirs resold it in 1661. That same year, 
Aepjen also resold land that had been included in a deed to van Rensselaer thirty years 
before.
314
 The second deed for Staten Island futilely asked that the sellers and their 
descendants agree not to make “any further claims” on the land.315 This, of course, was not 
heeded, since the English were compelled to purchase the land again later, but this is not the 
whole story.  
Cornelius Melyn’s account of the purchase of the Island reveals that the Indians were 
informally paid for the land again in 1631: 
I…caused the Indians to be askt whether they were not well recompenced by [Minuit] 
for said Island, They gave me for Answer, yet they had sold it to…[him] and were 
paid for it, but that it was their custome, when a New Governor came to such a place, 
that there should be a Gratuity given them; thereby to continue the friendship 
between the Indians and our nation, which I did.
316
 
 
In 1649, Melyn attempted to live on the Island with his family and was asked to repurchase 
it. Melyn produced the 1630 deed to remind them that it had already been purchased. The 
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Indians did not deny the purchase, but they did say that “they supposed by reason of the war, 
by killing, burning, and driving [the Dutch] off, [the Island] was become theirs again, and 
therefore thought that there must be a newbargain made.” Melyn refused to do this, saying 
that “that which is sold, must remain sold and that the Dutch will not pay twice for any things, 
which they have once bought.”317 He did give them a gift to maintain the old friendship, as he 
had done in 1631, though. Melyn goes on to explain that the WIC was forced to purchase 
the land once more in the 1650s after a settler talked to the original proprietors of purchasing 
it.
318
 Later, there was also a misunderstanding about hunting rights, the Indians saying that 
they had not ceded them, while Melyn thought that they had. The Indians held their ground, 
and it was eventually agreed that they would be allowed to hunt the Island in return for 10-
12 deer and “some Turkeys” per year.319 
 Looking at Melyn’s account and the Dutch deeds for Staten Island, it is evident that 
the Dutch were made to yield to the ultimate forms of Indian land tenure: they were 
effectively leasing Staten Island, doing so in the name of good diplomatic relations with its 
Indian owners, and compelled to share the use of the land with them. They even did the 
sharing in the Indian tradition: they had become the true owners, able to exact a tribute in 
deer and turkeys for the use of their land, but they could not bar their neighbors, the sellers, 
from utilizing it. Moreover, the Dutch were compelled to assert ownership through usufruct, 
the Indian way, since vacant land, whether by conquest, abandonment, or neglect, meant that 
a sale would expire and that a new purchase would eventually need to be negotiated. In return 
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for this adjustment to Indian land tenure, though, the Dutch received the continued right to 
use the land in peace (until the agreement had to be renewed, of course) and, in the second 
deed, used the purchase to cement a military alliance: the sellers promised “that if any other 
savages or nations should commit insolence, molestation or force against the inhabitants of 
Staten Island at any time, we shall assist in preventing and resisting them.”320 This agreement 
was nothing less than Dutch adoption of the traditional Indian use of land to cement political 
relationships. 
 In the story of the de-facto leasing of Staten Island, the strongest iteration of the 
Dutch-Indian middle ground of land tenures is visible. The Dutch had no option but to buy 
and use Staten Island in the Indian way, constantly inhabiting it and allowing its Indian 
owners hunting rights to keep the sale valid. The Indian sellers were obliged to affix their 
marks to numerous stern written deeds, to participate in odd deed reading and signing rituals, 
and had to concede to the veracity of this form of sale and its terms even as they resisted 
them. Additionally, they were only able to retain hunting rights to the land, rather than the 
more complete use rights that they were accustomed to retaining among themselves. But a 
middle ground is a compromise. It never entails complete satisfaction for one party. Rather, 
once such a thing is achieved, the evanescent period of cooperation and accommodation has 
disappeared, often to be replaced by an unequal relationship.  
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CONCLUSION 
 When they began to purchase land from their Indian neighbors, the Dutch had 
sought fairness in the name of peace and commerce; legal title in the face of Swedish and 
English encroachment; and a bargain on arable land. At first, they thought to have landed 
the deals of the century, acquiring hundreds of morgens of land at a time for what they 
considered an excellent price. Indians selling to them also viewed the sales as advantageous, 
using them to acquire useful, spiritually prized European goods and to bring Dutch trade 
and political alliance to their people. All this while retaining full use of the land. Both groups 
soon realized how wrong they were and that their conceptions of land use were quite 
different. 
 But Dutch people and their Indian trade partners found mutual advantage in keeping 
one another satisfied and their peoples united. Both groups resisted each other’s land law. 
Dutch buyers tried to compel Indians not to resell land and to vacate it upon selling it. 
Indians continued to use and resell deeded lands after a certain amount of time had elapsed. 
Both groups also cooperated. The Dutch accommodated Indian land tenure through a 
unique sale ritual complete with gift-giving and celebration and through permissiveness of 
ongoing negotiation after an agreement had been signed. They also grudgingly allowed sellers 
to retain hunting, fishing, and sometimes full usufruct rights to ceded lands, and even 
participated in effective leasing through official repurchases and informal gifts, which kept 
Indian demands for true repurchases at bay by renewing the agreement. Indians 
accommodated Dutch ritual, too, signing written documents and listening to recitations of 
their oddly fixed terms. They also acknowledged the sales when presented with the deeds 
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and with verbal reminders, which they could have shrugged off, in the name of keeping 
Dutch frustration at bay. In all likelihood, they also permitted permanence in some 
alienations of land due to the fact of extensive Dutch settlement in certain areas and to their 
growing power in the area. Whatever their consequences in the long run, the Dutch-Indian 
land transactions were a zone in which both Dutch and Indian land laws were in effect. This 
policy prevented what the Indians would have considered blatant thefts of their land, kept 
New Netherland a comparatively peaceful place with strong Indian allies, and, most 
importantly for the WIC running the Colony, kept the fur trade booming. 
 In the years after Dutch eviction from North America, however, things would begin 
to change for Indians in New Netherland. Leverage began to dwindle with the disappearance 
of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry. Still, Indian influence would remain strong for some time as the 
yet-young English colonies expanded. English leaders like William Penn and New York 
Governor Edmund Andros would participate in land deals with some of the flexibility and 
accommodation that characterized the Dutch-Indian transactions. Eventually, however, the 
middle ground’s disappearance would be complete, heralding the era of Indian 
dispossession by “deed,” “treaty,” and outright conquest.  
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